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Less than 10% of criminal offenses and civil lawsuits 
proceed as far as a trial by a jury of one's peers ~Burger, 
1970). In spite of this finding, the American trial system 
has commanded an extraordinary amount of attention in the 
popular press and scientific and professional literature. 
Several best-selling books (Alexander, 1979; Barthel, 1976; 
Bugliosi, 1974; Mailer, 1979; Nizer, 1966; Thompson, 1976) 
have recounted the exploits of various criminal defendants 
and their subsequent jury trials. And research by beha-
vioral scientists has grown steadily since the Chicago Jury 
Project and Kalven and Zeisel's (1966) The American Jury. 
Perhaps the extent of popular interest in the jury 
trial is due to its nature as a microcosm of society and its 
taboos, values, mores, and formal laws. In a jury trial, a 
group of twelve "average" people, a cross-section of society 
and chosen at least partly because of their inexperience, 
are asked to sit in judgment of one of their fellow citiz-
ens. 
Within the few days or weeks duration of a trial, 
jurors and spectators witness a highly ritualistic, institu-
l 
tionalized conflict between two opposing viewpoints. 
Ideally, within this highly structured format, "truth" is 
discovered and "good" triumphs over "evil." 
2 
Interest by social scientists is at least partly due to 
the interesting parallels between legal and scientific meth-
ods (Saks & Hastie, 1978). Both have elaborate rules 
detailing which facts/observations are to be considered and 
how they are to be presented. Both follow traditional, con-
servative decision-making policies. And both stress the 
value of recording past cases and applying them to present 
ones. 
On the other hand, there are several "fascinating dif-
ferences" (Saks & Hastie, 1978) between the two systems--the 
main distinction being that trial conventions such as "pre-
sumption of innocence" and "burden of proof" stand in con-
trast to the statistical decision-making of the scientific 
method. Even in these examples, however, there are ana-
logues to the scientific method: "Beyond a reasonable 
doubt" is a non-statistical form of "significant beyond the 
.OS level," and "presumption of innocence" is analogous to 
the "null hypothesis." Probably the greatest distinction 
between the two is the requirement of an unanimous jury ver-
dict as opposed to scientific "proof" through statistical 
probabilities. 
Social psychologists have shown an interest in the jury 
if for no other reason than its potential status as a 
"group." According to Sherif and Sherif (1953) there are 
minimum properties that define a group: 
A group is a social unit consisting of a num-
ber of individuals who stand in role and status 
relationships to one another, stabilized in some 
degree at the time, and who possess a set of 
values or norms of their own regulating their 
behavior, at least in matters of consequence to 
the group (p. 131). 
Status as a group is not an all-or-none proposition. 
"Groupness" is a matter of degree. Depending on the length 
of interaction and other factors, at least some juries will 
meet the minimum group properties. Thus, when viewed as a 
group, a jury could be one of many possible units for the 
study of interpersonal interaction, decision-making, commu-
nication patterns, status and role relations, group forma-
tion, cohesiveness, etc. 
Some social psychologists, although not particularly 
interested in the jury as a group per se, are more inter-
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ested in the individuals who comprise that group. While the 
jury must attempt to reach a final unanimous group decision 
(which it does not always do), the group, of course, con-
sists of separate individuals who each bring their own atti-
tudes and behavioral patterns to the group. Thus, a great 
deal of jury research pertains to an analysis of the effect 
of various individual attitudes on group behavior, i.e.,. 
verdicts and penalties. A sample of attitudes and behaviors 
which have been examined include attitude toward punish-
ment/rehabilitation of criminals, capital punishment, belief 
in a just world, authoritarianism, and perceived locus of 
control. 
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Additionally, a court trial provides a ready-made 
applied psychological laboratory. The major problem with in 
vivo jury studies is a distinct lack of scientific control. 
Juries are rarely a random sample and there is generally no 
control group with which to compare a jury verdict. How-
ever, problems of this sort should not preclude scientific 
investigation of jury behavior. Rather, these problems 
should serve as the impetus to resolve some of the conflicts 
between the criminal justice system and the behavioral sci-
ences. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature on juror and jury behavior covers quite 
a broad sprectrum. Early writings by psychologists and 
practicing lawyers tended to be rather anecdotal, emphasiz-
ing \>'hich ethnic or socio-economic groups would be partial 
to one side or the other (Darrow, 1936). In the 1950's the 
Chicago Jury Project studied real judges and jurors trying 
real cases. Jury deliberations were tape-recorded and 
although the information gained was voluminous, federal 
regulations make a research program· of this type no longer 
possible. More recently, efforts have been made to identify 
basic personality characteristics and group processes that 
may influence the outcome of a trial. This research has 
generally studied mock jurors and mock trials. Generaliza-
bility has therefore been a problem. Within the last ten 
years, multidisciplinary efforts have been made to apply 
jury research findings and basic psychological priniciples 
to the selection of juries in actual trials. These recent 
efforts have come partly 3t the request of attorneys and 
partly tbrough the desire of some behavioral scientists to 
effect changes in what they see as scientifically-antiquated 
practices in the American trial system. 
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Wall (1966) discussed the "interface" between legal and 
psychological systems in his book Psychology and Law in Con-
flict. He found the judicial system unaware of even basic 
psychological principles. Today psychologists are playing 
an increasingly greater role in the courtroom: testifying 
on eyewitness identification, selecting juries, conducting 
surveys to assess the extent of prejudicial attitudes, and 
so on. In spite of this, commentators such as Wrightsman 
(1978) believe that little real reform has actually been 
accomplished--and that "with respect to the trial jury, 
these two disciplines remain in conflict" (p. 137). 
One goal of the following literature review is to 
increase the reader's awareness of a few of the conflicts 
between "the law" and psychological research. As with 
nearly any behavioral experiment, most jury research is 
merely an analogous version of the real thing. This inesca-
pable dilemna is partly responsible for the conflict: There 
are always questions of generalizability based on subject 
pool, type of trial, mode of presentation, and so on. Alt-
hough any number of classification schema are possible, the 
major attention here will be placed on research investigat-
ing various factors that may potentially influence a jury's 
(or a juror's) verdict and sentence. Other research rele-
vant to the jury setting, such as attitude measurement and 
attribution will also be reviewed. As much as possible, 
this review will emphasize the subject sample, the type of 
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crime judged, the present~tion mode, the type of decision 
requested, and ~ny other factors that may potentially influ-
ence the generalizability of results. 
Factors Influencing Verdicts and 
Sentences 
Authoritarianism 
One of the first studies to apply psychological measur-
ing techniques to the study of conviction-prone jurors was 
by Boehm (1968). To study bias in jury verdicts, she devel-
oped a scale to measure authoritarian legal attitudes. The 
Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (LAQ) was constructed with the 
F-scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sa~ford, 
1950) and the Dogmatism scale (Rokeach, 1960) in mind, but 
was specifically an attempt to measure attitudes toward var-
ious legal issues. 
The LAQ was administered to a group of college students 
who then read a three-page written summary of trial evi-
dence. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions: In one case evidence was pro-prosecution, in the 
other it was pro-defense. Additionally, a page of jury 
instructions outlined the possible verdicts of second-degree 
murder, manslaughter, and acquittal. 
Results indicated that on the average the majority of 
subjects did view the slanted cases as expected. However, 
6/74 acquitted on the guilty version and 44/77 convicted on 
the not guilty version. 
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Because everyone expresses the three legal attitudes to 
some extent, LAQ scores were converted to standard scores. 
Subjects were then classified as primarily authoritarian, 
equalitarian, or anti-authoritarian on the basis of their 
highest standard score. Boehm found that authoritarians 
tended to give more severe verdicts than were warranted in 
the pro-defense version, whereas anti-authoritarians tended 
to give less severe verdicts than indicated by the pro-pro-
secution evidence. Thus, Boehm showed that authoritarians 
are conviction-prone and anti-authoritarians tend to acquit, 
regardless of the evidence. Unfortunately, Boehm reports no 
results for equalitarians. 
While the paper-and-pencil format made it impossible to 
determine what effect these systematic errors would have on 
a group deliberation, Boehm reports that authoritarians and 
anti-authoritarians were more confident of their verdicts 
than equalitarians. Thus, it is possible that "in a group 
deliberation, the biased individual, especially the authori-
tarian, might exert considerable influence" (p. 746). 
A study by Jurow (1971) examined the relationship bet-
ween capital punishment attitudes and verdicts in an attempt 
to provide empirical data. to "force the [Supreme] Court to 
reconsider its 'Witherspoon' holding regarding the 'death 
qualified' jury" (p. 568). Subjects were industrial workers 
in a division of the Sperry Rand Corporation. Although more 
representative than the average college sample, subjects 
were fairly well-educated, had a high median income, and 
were "overwhelmingly" white. Nearly half described them-
selves as Republicans or conservatives, and Roman Catholics 
accounted for neary half of the population. Over a third 
were engineers. Approximately one-third of subjects had 
previous experience as actual jurors. 
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Jurow administered a battery of attitude scales to sub-
jects and presented tape-recorded versions of two trials. 
The scales included Jurow's Capital Punishment Attitude 
Questionnaire (CPAQ--Form A measures general attitudes, Form 
B asks the subject to respond as if he/she were a jury mem-
ber), Thurstone's (1932) Capital Punishment Attitude Scale, 
Adorno et al.'s (1950) F-scale, Boehm's {19G8) LAQ, and a 
Conservatism-Liberalism Scale based on the Dogmatism Scale 
(Rokeach, 1960). Case I was the murder trial of an ex-con-
vict seen running from the vicinity of a liquor store holdup 
in which the proprietor was killed. Case II was the trial 
of a narcotics addict accused of robbing, raping, and kill-
ing a college girl in her apartment. In both tapes, evi-
dence was weighted equally for acquittal and conviction. 
The trial script included direct and cross examination of 
witnesses and judge's instructions to the jury. The liquor 
store trial was always presented before the rape/murder. 
Jurow reports that analysis of the CPAQ data indicated 
that potential jurors distinguished on the basis of the CPAQ 
also varied in willingness to convict: A favorable attitude 
toward capital punishment was related to a tendency to con-
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viet. Results were significant only for the liquor store 
holdup (Case I), although the rape/murder data (Case II) was 
in the predicted direction. 
Jurow additionally compared subjects who voted guilty 
and those who voted not guilty on each of the various atti-
tude scales. On the average subjects voted to acquit on 
Case I (56%) and to convict on Case II {58%). The only var-
iable that discriminated between verdicts on both cases was 
the authoritarian subscale of the LAQ. Subjects convicting 
had significantly higher scores than those acquitting. How-
ever, most other scales were significant for Case I. The 
Conservatism-Liberalism scale was significant only for Case 
II; the F-scale surprisingly was significant for neither 
case. 
In summary, Jurow notes that the finding th~t the LAQ 
was the best predictor of verdicts suggests that one's 
orientation toward conviction or acquittal may depend upon 
one's attitude toward various legal standards such as the 
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. 
Jurow's study points out the care that must be given to 
the selection of trial stimuli. It is difficult to know if 
the general failure to replicate for Case II is due to (a) 
the case itself (the victim was robbed and raped in addition 
to being murdered}, {b) the inability of the attitude scales 
to discern differences among subject jurors in all cases, or 
(c) an order effect due to always presenting Case I before 
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Case II. The attitude scales were also apparently presented 
in the same order--to avoid problems, their order should be 
randomized if possible. 
A study by Mitchell and Byrne (1973) compared the ver-
dicts of high and low authoritarians. Mitchell and Byrne 
studied 139 introductory psychology students. Each subject 
was administered a six-page booklet containing instructions, 
a case description, an opinion questionnaire, and a 22-item 
acquiescence-free version of the F-scale (Byrne & Lamberth, 
cited in Mitchell & Byrne, 1973). The "defendant," a col-
lege student, was accused of stealing exams. Through the 
use of a pretest, the similarity of the defendant and each 
subject (0% or 100%) was manipulated by administering one of 
44 combinations of statements about the defendant. 
Results indicated that authoritarians were less certain 
of the defendant's guilt in the similar condition, and that 
in the dissimilar condition, authoritarians recommended more 
severe punishment than subjects in the other conditions. 
Subjects in the high attitude similarity condition and low 
authoritarians attributed significantly more attraction to 
the defendant. 
Mitchell and Byrne note that the effects of attitude 
similarity and authoritarianism were more complex than ori-
ginally hypothesized. An authoritarian presented with a 
·similar defendant shows a bias in his/her favor, equalitari-
ans do not. In both groups, attitude similarity was found 
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to affect evaluative responses (such as defendant morality) 
but equalitarians did not allow this to influence their 
decision on verdict or punishment. Further studies showed 
that neither attitude similarity alone nor a trial situation 
alone was sufficient to evoke the authoritarian reaction. 
However, it was quite strong when the two were combined. 
A study by Berg and Vidmar (1975) was designed to test 
the effect of authoritarianism on jurors' recall of evi-
dence. A college student sample responded to Boehm's (1968) 
LAQ and read two cases involving students charged with vio-
lating university regulations. (one case was adapted from 
Mitchell & Byrne, 1973). Authoritarianism scores were 
achieved by subtracting subjects' equalitarianism score from 
their authoritarianism score on the LAQ. Subjects responded 
by indicating certainty of guilt (from 1 to 7), assessing a 
penalty (ranging from dismissal to permanent expulsion), and 
indicating personal feelings about the defendant (from 
"extremely negative" to "extremely positive") and his social 
status (high or low). The lower the status of the defen-
dant, the more certain jurors were of his guilt. High 
authoritarians assigned more severe punishment to low status 
defendants and indicated a more negative attitude to him 
than other jurors. Therefore, Berg and Vidmar write that 
"authoritarian discrimination in punitiveness extends to 
social status characteristics of the defendant as well as 
belief and general character differences" (p. 152). 
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Additionally, subjects were contacted between 7 and 10 
days later to measure recall of "situational" evidence and 
"character" evidence. Situational recall included questions 
such as "Who saw the defendant?" and "What were the clues?" 
Character recall consisted of questions about the defen-
dant's personal characteristics such as "What was his 
major?" and "How long had he attended the university?" High 
authoritarians recalled significantly more character evi-
dence, whereas low authoritarians recalled significantly 
more pieces of situational evidence. Berg and Vidmar note 
that the experiment may be criticized because subjects' 
recall may be affected by their decision about guilt and 
punishment._ Also, the experiment did not test recall dif-
ferences for high and low status defendants. 
A second experiment studied generally older subjects 
(extension course students) who responded to Byrne & Lam-
berth's (cited in Mitchell & Byrne, 1973) authoritarianism 
scale and read a summary of an automobile manslaughter case 
{modified from Landy & Aronson, 1969). Tested 1 week later 
in class, high authoritarians again recalled more character 
evidence and less about situational evidence, although this 
latter finding only approached significance. Thus, recall 
results were apparently not due to guilt/punishment deci-
sions or to effects peculiar to only one type of defendant 
character. Although Mitchell and Byrne {1973) hypothesized 
that high authoritarians cannot separate affective reactions 
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to the defendant from legal decisions, Berg und Vidmar pro-
pose that verdict and sentencing differences between t1igh 
and low authoritarians may be based on cognitive differences 
in interpretation of evidence as well as motivational and 
affective differences in regard to the defendant. 
Bray and Noble (1978) investigated the effects of 
authoritarianism on both individual juror and jury Geci-
sions. Psychology student subjects responded to Byrne's 
(1974) V8rsicn of the F-scale earlier in a semester and lis-
tened to a 30-minute audio recording of a murder trial in 
the experimental session. Before and after deliberations, 
jurors made judgments about whether the defendant was guilty 
or not guilty. Results indicated that high authoritarians 
voted guilty significantly more often than low authoritari-
ans, both before and after deliberations, ar.d that after 
deliberation there was a general shift toward fewer guilty 
verdicts. Although nearly 80% of jurors did not change 
their verdicts, high authoritarians were found to change 
more often th2n low authoritarians. Significantly longer 
sentences were given by high authoritarians than low autho-
ritarians. Deliberation seemed to polarize this effect: 
high authori~arians' sentences became more severe, low 
authoritarians' more lenient than pre-deliberation. 
Sentence data were taken from all subjects, regardless 
of verdicts. (The range was from 14 years to 99 years.) 
Innocent voting subjects were asked to assume the defendant 
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had been found guilty. Although this procedure is of ques-
tionable validity, subjects' sentences were not signifi-
cantly affected by their verdict of guilt or innocence. 
High authoritarians recommended significantly more years 
imprisonment than low authoritarians. Analysis of similar-
ity data indicated that jurors generally considered them-
selves dissimilar to the defendant. Females and high 
authoritarians judged themselves less similar to the 
defendant than males and low authoritarians, respectively. 
Since jurors were not given a choice of death as a 
potential penalty, subjects were asked to indicate the like-
lihood of their returning a guilty verdict if a death sen-
tence was possible. High authoritarians were significantly 
more likely to vote guilty in this case than low authorita-
rians. Thus, results generally support Boehm (1968), Jurow 
(1971), and Mitchell and Byrne (1973). 
Centers, Shomer, and Rodriques (1970) int~rviewed a 
cross-section of Los Angeles adults to ascertain if authori-
tarians would be more likely to change their opinion follow-
ing a communication from an authoritative source. Subjects 
were asked a broad range of questions, including several 
about juvenile delinquency. The interviewer then told about 
a juvenile who had been arrested with several adults for 
robbery and asked if the juvenile should be treated simi-
larly to or more leniently than the adults. If the subject 
proposed a harsh sentence, he was told that "leading 
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experts" have said that harsh treatment starts a juvenile on 
a life of crime. If the subject proposed a lenient sen-
tence, he was told that "leading experts" say lenient 
treatment leads to repeated criminal activity. Sandford and 
Older's (1950) authoritarianism-equalitarianism (A-E) scale 
was then administered. Although three-fourths of subjects 
chose a lenient alternative, the higher the A-E score, the 
more likely the subject initially chose a harsh punishment. 
Subjects in the upper-third of A-E scores were found to 
change their mind significantly more often when presented 
with a "leading expert" than subjects in the lower-third. 
The middle-third was not significantly different from either 
of the other groups. These results tend to support Bray and 
Noble's (1978) finding that high authoritarian jurors were 
more likely to change their verdict after deliberation than 
low authoritarian jurors. 
Roberts and Jesser (1958) studied the interrelations 
among authoritarianism, punitiveness, and status. College 
students responded to the California F-scale (Adorno et al., 
1950) and a semi-projective technique based on the Rosenz-
weig Picture-Frustration Study (Rosenzweig, 1945). Indepen-
dently of status, high and low authoritarians did not differ 
with respect to extrapunitiveness (directly hostile response 
to frustration). When status is considered, high authorita-
rians responded with more personal hostility to low status 
frustrators and more displaced hostility to high status 
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frustrators than low authoritarians. Low authoritarians 
generally responded to frustrators independently of status. 
The authors conclude that punitiveness is a function of both 
individual personality characteristics and the particular 
social environment. 
Verdict and Sentence Alternatives 
Vidmar (1972) varied the number and severity of verdict 
alternatives in a study based on the "Algiers Motel murders" 
in Detroit, Michigan in 1967. Psychology students read a 
transcript of a murder trial, indicated individual verdicts, 
and answered questions about the defendant and trial testi-
mony. Decision alternatives were presented in all combina-
tions of (a) guilty of murder I, (b) guilty of murder II, 
(c) guilty of manslaughter, and (n) not guilty. The data 
indicated that restricting possible decision alternatives, 
especially when the guilty alternative has what may be per-
ceived as a too severe consequence, may increase the likeli-
hood of obtaining a not guilty verdict. Subjects who had at 
least a "moderate" penalty option chose "not guilty" only 
approximately 6% of the time, but 54% chose "not guilty" 
when faced with only a "severe" penalty. Social perception 
questions indicated that subjects voting guilty said that 
the defendant should be treated harshly, that his mother's 
and brother's testimony was biased, and that a customer's 
testimony was improbable, significantly more often than sub-
jects voting not guilty. 
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A study by Kaplan and Simon (1972) was also an attempt 
to empirically investigate the role of severity options. 
College student subjects read about a hypothetical traffic 
fatality and judged guilt or innocence of the driver. 
Within the scenario, race of victim (white or black), 
strength of evidence (high, moderate, mixed, or low), and 
latitude and severity of decision structure were manipu-
lated. Decision alternatives were: (a) not guilty or man-
slaughter, (b) not guilty or murder II, (c) not guilty or 
murder I, and (d) not guilty, manslaughter, murder II, or 
murder I. 
Race of victim had no effect on any dependent variable. 
The severity of punishment associated with a guilty verdict 
was found to be inversely related to the percentage of 
guilty decisions. The most innocent verdicts were returned 
in the "not guilty or murder I" condition for both black and 
white victims. 
Thus results tend to support Vidmar's (1972) findings 
and suggest that the inclusion of middle-ground verdicts _ 
produces a smaller percentage of not guilty verdicts than do 
two-choice structures when the option is greater than man-
slaughter. The two-choice structure tends to produce a 
higher level of first and second degree decisions than the 
four-choice structure. This trend reverses, however, with 
decreasing evidence strength. Kaplan and Simon note that 
one explanation for the results could be that the traffic 
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fatality is seen as incompatible with any guilty verdict 
other than manslaughter--first degree murder is obviously 
too severe a verdict. At the same time, however, high guilt 
evidence makes innocence an unacceptable verdict. The juror 
is faced with two unsatisfactory alternatives, but the 
inclusion of middle-ground choices may alleviate this prob-
lem. 
Larntz (1975) reanalyzed Vidmar's (1972) data with the 
use of a simple probabalistic model. The model he proposes 
holds that possible decisions in the various restricted con-
ditions will be distributed in proportion to their occur-
rence in the unrestricted condition. With use of the model, 
Vidmar's conclusion that the more severe the most lenient 
alternative is, the greater the likelihood of a not guilty 
verdict, is not warranted. Larntz notes "It is not surpris-
ing that a relatively large percentage of not guilty ver-
dicts are given when not guilty is compared with another 
unlikely event," such as guilt of first degree murder (p. 
125). It should also be noted that Kaplan and Simon's 
(1972) data are subject to the same criticisms that Larntz 
makes of Vidmar's data. 
Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, and Holt (1977) varied sev-
erity of consequences to victim and sentence severity in a 
study of both six person juries and individual jurors. Male 
and female psychology students responded to a questionnaire 
and read summaries of four newspaper articles, which con-
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tained the manipulations of victim consequences and sentence 
severity. Subjects were then shown a 50-minute videotaped 
mock rape trial adapted from Norris {1965) and Davis, et al. 
{1975), and responded to three separate items regarding 
guilt: a dichotomous "guilty--not guilty" item, a 7-point 
scale from guilty to innocent, and an 11-point scale from 
0/10 to 10/10 chances of defendant's guilt. Six-man juries 
then deliberated until a two-thirds majority had been 
achieved, while individuals wrote trial summaries. 
The experimental manipulations did not significantly 
affect predeliberation opinions, although females were more 
likely than males to return a guilty verdict on all three 
scales. Postdeliberation analysis of verdicts indicated 
that no main effect or interaction was significant for 
either juries or jurors. However, after deliberating, 
juries were less likely to convict the defendant than the 
congregate individuals. Females were again more likely to 
convict, although 18.3% shifted to not guilty and only 5.5% 
shifted to guilty. Males rarely changed verdicts. This 
effect is probably due to situational factors present in the 
study. As in other studies which report this effect, the 
trial stimulus was a rape case. Davis et al. conclude that 
"if racial imbalance on a jury can violate the civil rights 
of a defendant, it is likely that male-female imbalance can 
violate something of the same" {p. 364). 
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McComas & Noll (1974) attempted to eliminate the con-
founding of charge seriousness with sentence severity by 
crossing three levels of charges (murder I, murder II, man-
slaughter) with three levels of sentences (1-5 years, 5-20 
years, and 25 years-life). College students read tri~l sum-
maries similar to those of Vidmar (1972), and indicated 
guilt on a 7-point scale. Only the main effect of charge 
was significant. 
degree of guilt. 
The lower the charge, the greater the 
No sex differences were analyzed. Alt-
hough the punishment severity main effect was nonsignifi-
cant, subjects were asked "How guilty is the defendant of 
the charge, with the sentence of (1-5, 5-20, 25-life)?" The 
two dependent variables, verdict and sentence, should prob-
ably have been asked independently of each other as in most 
criminal trials. 
In a study comparing the severity of punishment for 
cases of rape and robbery, Scroggs (1976) found an interac-
tion of victim resistance with sex for both cases, which 
were presented in written format. Males gave more lenient 
sentences when the victim did not resist; females gave 
harsher sentences when the victim did not resist. Overall, 
females gave more guilty verdicts than males, and more 
guilty verdicts were returned for rape than robbery. Sub-
jects in the experiment were both college students and their 
parents. 
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In a review of 111 capital murder cases, Kalven and 
Zeisel (1966) compared actual jury sentences to those the 
presiding judge would have given. Juries recommended prison 
81% of the time and the death penalty 19%. Judges gave a 
prison sentence in 74% and the death penalty in 26% of the 
cases. Judge and jury agreed 81% of the time. Judges were 
harsher in 13% of the cases, juries in 6%. Judge/jury 
agreement on the death penalty was marked especially by hei-
nous, gratuitous violence. Disagreements included cases of 
mental and emotional instability; sudden, wild anger; domes-
tic tension; and jury alienation by the defendant and/or 
attorney. 
Defendant Characteristics 
Landy and Aronson (1969) varied the social attractive-
ness of the victim and the defendant in two related studies. 
College student subjects read an account of a negligent 
automobile homicide and were asked to sentence the defendant 
(who they apparently were to assume was guilty). Experi-
ments 1 and 2 indicated that the mean sentence in the 
attractive victim condition was greater than the unattrac-
tive condition, although this difference was not signifi-
cant. However, when sentence data were standardized and 
combined for Experiments 1 and 2, the difference was signi-
ficant. Additionally, Experiment 2 showed that defendant 
characteristics significantly affected sentencing: Attrac-
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tive and neutral defendants were treated more leniently than 
unattractive defendants. No sex differences were found in 
Experiment 1 and none are reported for Experiment 2. 
The defendant's race and attractiveness and mock 
jurors' school affiliation were manipulated by Nemeth and 
Sosis (1973). Jurors were students at either a junior col-
lege or a university, both in Chicago. Defendant character-
istics and the particular case (negligent homicide) were 
adapted from Landy and Aronson (1969). The unattractive 
defendant was sentenced more harshly than the attractive 
defendant, and the junior college sample was harsher overall 
than the university sample. The junior college subjects 
were harsher on the unattractive defendant than the attrac-
tive defendant, but the university sample showed no differ-
ences. In general, defendant's race had no effect, although 
the junior college sample was harsher on white defendants 
than the university sample. 
Although the authors mention a measure of "attributed 
guilt," no results for this variable are reported. Nemeth 
and Sosis conclude that characteristics of both defP.ndant 
0nd juror (such as school attended) are important in deter-
mining sentencing behavior. However, as Gerbasi, Zuckerman, 
and Reis (1977) note, many factors may potentially covary 
with school attended, such as economic level, race, prior 
education, etc. Subjects were also recruited by different 
methods at the two schools. 
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Barnett and Feild (1978) presented written versions of 
a trial to randomly selected adult citizens. In the rape 
case, defendant's race and attractiveness were varied, while 
in the burglary case, defendant's sex was added. Subjects 
were not asked to return a verdict, but rather to sentence 
an obviously guilty defendant. 
For the rape case, a strong main effect of attractive-
ness was obtained. For the burglary case, only the interac-
tion of attractiveness and sex approached significance. 
This result was mainly due to attractive males being sen-
tenced to longer sentences than attractive females. Race of 
defendant was not significant for any dependent measure. 
The authors conclude that attractiveness was significant· 
only for rape due to the incongruity of being faced with an 
~ttractive rape defendant. This may have resulted in a 
denial of guilt, thus leading to more lenient sentences. 
Such stereotypes probably do not hold for burglary defen-
dants. However, because subjects were not asked to return a 
verdict, the precise explanation remains unclear. Thus, 
nature of the crime--person vs. property--appears to moder-
ate the effect of attractiveness on jurors' sentences. 
Feild and Barnett (1978) compared the sentences of col-
lege subjects and adult citizens for a mock rape trial. 
Adults were older than students and 31% had served on a 
jury, whereas none of the students had. Defendant's race 
and social attractiveness were varied in the study. Sub-
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jects indicated only the sentence for the defendant. 
Attractive defendants received a significantly shorter sen-
tence than unattractive defendants. College students were 
found to be significantly more lenient than adults. Thus, 
this study questions the generalizability of all jury stu-
dies using student subjects. However, in spite of the 
significant main effect for type of juror, omega-square 
revealed that only 3% of the variance of sentences could be 
accounted for by the type of juror. Apparently then, the 
subject population may have only minimal practical effects 
on the generalizability of mock trial results. 
Efran (1974} conducted both an opinion survey and an 
experimental study in regard to the effect of the defen-
dant's physical appearance on juror behavior. Male and 
female college students responding to the survey indicated 
that a defendant's character and previous history should 
influence judicial decisions (79%), but that physical 
appearance should not (93%). In the experimental study 
(involving a student-faculty court), however, the main 
effect of attractiveness was significant for verdict, pun-
ishment, and attraction. Attractive defendants were consis-
tently judged as less guilty, and less deserving of severe 
punishment than less attractive defendants. Further tests 
indicated that when males and females are considered sepa-
rately only the differences for males are significant. 
Efran concludes that females "may respond less discrimina-
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tively [th?n males] when attractiveness cues are presented 
incidentally in a task which does not focus on that informa-
tion" (p. 51). 
Griffit and Jackson (1973) varied the similarity of the 
defendant's attitudes to those of college student jurors, 
and exposed subjects to a videotaped account (not a mock 
trial) of a negligent automobile homicide. The degree of 
defendant-juror attitude similarity significantly influenced 
judgments of guilt, sentence length, and attraction. Length 
of sentence until parole eligibility was borderline signifi-
cant. In all cases, dissimilar defendants were treated more 
harshly than similar defendants. Overall, females sentenced 
the defendant to a longer sentence, and required more time 
to be served until pnrole than males. 
Stephan (1974) had male and female college students 
read a two-page synopsis of a murder trial in which the sex 
of the defendant was manipulated. Subjects returned either 
individual or group verdicts. Results indicated that males' 
verdicts favored the male defendant, while females' favored 
the female defendant. Collapsing across sex conditions, 
females reported more empathy for the defendant than male 
subjects. Males rendered longer sentences in the group con-
dition while females' sentences were longer in the indivi-
dual condition. Implications of the results are limited by 
the fact that groups were composed of only three same-sex 




Bridgeman and Marlowe (1979) conducted post-trial 
interviews with 65 actual jurors following their service on 
criminal felony juries. The jurors participuted in ten dif-
ferent trials including heroin possession, rape, robbery, 
and murder. The sample was of relatively young, well-edu-
cated, middle-class, moderate-to-liberal, infrequent church 
attenders. Because the emphasis was on jurors' perceptions, 
conclusions are limited by the self-report data. Jurors 
learn what is expected of them, and may attempt to justif~ 
their verdicts by giving socially-desirable responses. The 
authors did assure jurors of confidentiality and the lack of 
"right" or "wrong" answers. 
Neither the interview nor the demographic data were 
related to the first ballot verdict or the final verdict. 
On the first ballot, 65% of jurors voted to convict, 29% 
voted to acquit, and 6% voted undecided. After two ballots, 
95% of jurors had made an unaltered decision on the verdict. 
Although 33% reported changing their vote at least once, the 
minority never changed the majority opinion. On the final 
verdict, 82% of defendants were convicted. Thus the jury's 
deliberations did not appear to significantly alter final 
verdicts. Only 23% reported "deliberation proceedings" as 
the main reason for their final vote; only 17% stated the 
other jurors' opinions had influenced them. Most jurors 
(59%) mentioned a "review of the evidence" as the most 
influential factor in the verdict. 
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A ranking of the importance of various verdict factors 
indicated that jurors attached more importance to the testi-
mony of police, the defendant, and other witnesses than to 
the attorneys, the judge, experts, the defendant's appear-
ance, or jury deliberations. 
Bridgeman and Marlowe conclude that jurors are reasona-
ble, sensitive, and concerned with being fair and just. 
Jurors rely primarily on evidence presented during the trial 
and are little influenced by attorney style or defendant's 
appearance. However, 35% of jurors reported that they had 
reached a "fairly certain" decision "near the beginning" or 
"near the middle" of the trial. Another 47% indicated they 
had reached a verdict after the trial, but before the deli-
beration. Thus, the authors hypothesize a two-stage deci-
sion-making process. First, mainly on the basis of trial 
testimony a juror r~aches a decision on guilt or innocence. 
Next, the juror seeks consensual validation of his opinion 
by listening to other jurors. 
Mills and Bohannon (1980) mailed surveys to former 
jurors randomly selected from Baltimore jury panels in order 
to examine the relationship of verdict and various demo-
graphic variables. The response rate was 36%, but respon-
dents' demographic characteristics were generally similar to 
the panel as a whole. The demographic variables of interest 
were sex, age, race, and education. Females reported more 
initial guilty verdicts than males (2/3 of all guilty ver-
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diets were returned by females) , especially in rape and 
murder cases. This sex difference is mediated by race. 
Black females voted guilty (initially) significantly more 
often than black males; no differences were found for white 
males and females. 
Jurors' guilty verdicts generally increased with age, 
particularly for rape. However, females' guilty verdicts 
remained fairly high, whereas males' significantly increased 
with age. The same general effect was found for education: 
Females' guilt verdicts were high overall, but males 
accounted for the general decrease in guilt verdicts with 
higher levels of education. Females were chosen as foremen 
significantly less often and felt significantly less 
influential in changing other jurors' verdicts than males. 
Multiple regression analyses were performed on the four 
demographic variables. Together, the four variables 
accounted for 10-16% of the variance in verdicts. In most 
instances, only one or two variables were correlated to any 
extent with the·verdict. Age was the best verdict predictor 
for murder cases, with younger jurors more likely to con-
vict. For rape cases, age and education were the best pred-
ictors: Older people and less educated jurors were more 
likely to convict. Sex was the best predictor for robbery 
with women more likely to convict than men. No significant 
relationships were found for rae~ and verdict. 
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The study, of course, is somewhat limited in interpre-
tation due to the self-report data. But, apparently mean-
ingful relationships emerged despite the fact that some 
effects may have been lessened due to the elimination of 
"extreme" jurors through voir dire challenges. 
Baldwin and McConville {1980) studied the composition 
of actual juries in Birmingham, England. Although the 
juries were not very representative of the larger community, 
no variable analyzed affected verdicts: Sex, age, social 
class, and foreman characteristics were all nonsignificant 
in regard to predicting verdicts. Results are not due to 
any systematic bias by attorneys in selecting jurors. In 
England, both prosecution and defense are highly limited in 
questioning potential jurors and therefore are limited in 
exercising any informed juror challenges. 
Evidence Strength 
Saks, Werner, and Ostrom (1975) sampled former jurors 
from Columbus, Ohio. Subjects read several brief, hypothet-
ical cases in which the crime, the amount of evidence, and 
the strength of evidence were varied. They also responded 
to a defendant attitudes scale and were classified as "pro-" 
or "anti-defendant." Anti-defendant jurors rated the defen-
dant as more guilty than pro-defendant jurors. However, the 
amount of evidence accounted for three times more variance, 
and strength of evidence seven times more than juror charac-
teristics. 
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Rumsey & Rumsey (1977) examined verdicts and sentences 
of college students before and after deliberation under two 
levels each of evidence ambiguity (high or low) and judge's 
instructions (present or absent). Group discussions were 
composed of two males and two females. Subjects read a rape 
case description and indicated verdict, sentence, and victim 
and defendant responsibility. Although several analyses 
approached significance, none were for either verdict or 
sentence. For example, females were more certain of guilt 
than males. Overall, females blamed the defendant more than 
males. Males saw the defendant as more responsible in the 
low ambiguity condition than the high condition, whereas 
females saw him as more responsible under high ambiguity. 
Males blamed the victim more in the high ambiguity condi-
tion, females placed more blame in the low condition. 
Lack of significance on most verdict results could be 
due to the method of coding data. Subjects indicated ver-
dicts on a 7-point scale. The combination resulted in a 
14-point continuum such that l="not guilty, very certain"; 
?="not guilty, very uncertain"; 8="guilty, very uncertain"; 
and 14="guilty, very certain." Sex differences are most 
easily explained by the crime on trial: rape. The authors 
note that when evidence is in doubt, males tend to exculpate 
defendants by transferring some blame to the victim, 
although females rarely do the same. When the evidence 
against the defendant is less ambiguous, these tendencies 
are much less apparent. 
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Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, and Davis (1976) 
varied the definition of reasonable doubt (undefined, strin-
gent, or lax) and assigned decision rule (unanimous or 2/3 
majority). College subjects read news summaries and viewed 
a 50-minute videotape of a rape trial. Predeliberation 
results indicated a significant effect for reasonable doubt: 
The largest proportion of guilty verdicts was obtained in 
the lax-criterion condition with smaller proportions in the 
undefined and stringent-criterion condtions. There were 
also more "no opinion" responses in the undefined condition 
than in the stringent or lax conditions. Females more often 
convicted than males and less frequently indicated "no opin-
ion" on the first ballot. 
Postdeliberation jury verdicts indicated the decision 
rule was significant with more guilty verdicts in the major-
ity condition, mainly due to the number of hung juries in 
the unanimous condition. Reasonable doubt definition was 
found to significantly affect verdicts when hung juries were 
excluded, but not when included. 
Once again, conclusions (at least in regard to sex dif-
ferences) are limited due to the use of a rape trial stimu-
lus. The authors report that "maximum conflict" situations, 
such as an even split of verdicts in the unanimous decision 
rule jury, are most likely to be governed by the nature of 
the particular case, the subject population, individual 
juror characteristics, and other social factors. Subjects 
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became significantly more lenient on sentence after deliber-
ation, but not on verdict. 
Just World Belief 
Rubin and Peplau (1975) cite two studies regarding just 
world belief and reactions to criminal defendants. Izzett 
compared the reactions of high and low just world subjects 
to a criminal defendant in a mock negligent homicide case. 
High just world subjects formed a significantly less favora-
ble opinion of the defendant and tended to assign more sev-
ere penalties than low just world subjects. Gerbasi and 
Zuckerman sampled a population of former jurors. In a mock 
trial, high just world subjects gave more severe verdicts 
than low just world subjects. Rubin and Peplau note that 
These results suggest that people who believe in a 
just world may feel special hostility toward the 
agents of unjust suffering, at least in those 
cases in which the agent has already been singled 
out and accused of a crime (p. 72). 
Miscellaneous 
A study by Davis, Stasser, Spitzer, and Holt (1976) was 
mainly concerned with the effect of deliberation on "public" 
and "private"-juries. Juries were composed of college stu-
dents who saw a tape of a rape trial (Norris, 1965). A 
public jury was told its decision would be reviewed by a 
panel of "experts." Public juries more quickly changed 
opinions than private juries. The distribution of guilty 
verdicts for public and private individuals did not signifi-
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cantly differ. However, the proportion of guilty verdicts 
was significantly greater for both public and private indi-
viduals than for public or private juries. Females were 
more likely to convict than males although the rape trial 
stimulus most likely accounts for this difference. 
Hendrick and Shaffer (1975) presented to simulated stu-
dent jurors a brief transcript of a murder trial in which 
the number of killers and the extent of victim mutilation 
had been varied. The main dependent measure was the number 
of years jurors sentenced the defendant(s) to prison. (The 
alternatives ranged from 5 to 99 years.) The only signifi-
cant effect was due to the mutilation variable. When muti-
lation of the victim occurred (after the murder) jurors 
added approximately 50 years to the sentence. Subjects also 
tended not to want mutilators released on parole, and in the 
mutilation condition, indicated a significantly more favora-
ble attitude toward the death penalty. Single killers and 
mutilators were judged as more likely insane than group kil-
lers and nonmutilators. In spite of this, subjects per-
ceived greater intentionality for the murder when mutilation 
occurred. 
Juhnke, Vought, Pyszczynski, Dane, Losure, and Wrights-
man (1979) investigated the effect of trial presentation 
mode .on mock jurors' .reactions to the trial. The trial for 
transportation of a stolen vehicle was presented in one of 
four modes: videotape, audiotape, transcript, or written 
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summary. Psychology students served as jurors. Results 
indicated significant differences in frequencies of dichoto-
mous guilty/not guilty verdicts and probabalistic verdicts. 
More guilty verdicts were found in the videotape version 
than any of the other three. More guilt verdicts were also 
found in the audiotape,mode than the summary mode. Other 
differences were nonsignificant. Presentation mode also 
affected jurors' perceptions of the effectiveness with which 
the case was presented, but did not significantly affect 
perceptions of witnesses. Analyses of sex differences indi-
cated that males were more confident of their verdicts in 
the probabilistic format than females. Additionally, 
. 
females relied more heavily on the prosecutor's closing 
argument in the audiotape mode than males, and were more 
influenced overall. 
Attitude Measurement 
Boehm (1966) developed the Legal Attitudes Question-
naire (LAQ) as a measure of authoritarian legal attitudes. 
The LAQ consists of ten forced-choice triads and gives 
scores for three subscales: authoritarianism, equalitarian-
ism, and anti-authoritarianism. 
Authoritarian items expressed right wing philoso-
phy, endorsed indiscriminately the acts of consti-
tuted authority, or were essentially punitive in 
nature. Anti-authoritarian items expressed left 
wing sentiments, implied that the blame for all 
antisocial acts rested with the structure of 
society, or indiscriminately rejected the acts of 
constituted authority. Equalitarian items 
endorsed traditional, liberal, nonextreme posi-
tions on legal questions or were couched in a form 
that indicated the questions reasonably could have 
two answers (p. 740}. 
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Boehm found that the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950) was posi-
tively correlated with the authoritarian subscale, and nega-
tively related to the equalitarian and anti-authoritarian 
subscales. The Dogmatism scale (Rokeach, 1960) was posi-
tively correlated with both authoritarianism and 
anti-authoritarianism, but negatively associated with equal-
itarianism. Boehm reports that the degree of statistical 
significance was acceptable, though not extremely high. 
Thus the LAQ, to some extent, taps the same attitudinal 
dimensions as these established measures. 
Shaw and Wright (1967) cite several studies which have 
analyzed Thurstone's (1932) Capital Punishment Scale. Lorge 
reports reliability estimates ranging from .59 to .88; Fer-
guson reports a range of .79 to .88. Thurstone established 
a test-retest reliability coefficient of .71. Diggory 
reports correlations of +.26 and +.42 between this scale and 
Thurstone's Punishment of Criminals Scale. 
Moore (1975) administered,Thurstone's Attitude Toward 
Capital Punishment Scale to college subjects ten days before 
the November, 1972, California election in which a proposi-
t~on advocating the reinstatement of the death penalty was 
on the ballot. The proposition passed. The attitude scale 
was able to discriminate those subjects who voted for the 
proposition and those who voted against it. Only one sub-
37 
ject who voted against the proposition was rated as having a 
favorable attitude toward capital punishment. The scale was 
also administered the day after the election. A product-mo-
ment correlation was computed, indicating test-retest relia-
bility. The correlation was 0.92. Thus, Thurstone's scale 
was both a valid and reliable predictor of subject votes on 
the capital punishment proposition. 
In a review of the Punishment of Criminals Scale, Shaw 
and Wright (1967) report that Lorge found reliability esti-
mates of .69 to .76, and Ferguson found a range from .57 to 
.73. Thurstone obtained a test-retest reliability coeffi-
cient of .66~ Diggory found correlations of +.50 and +.30 
with Thurstone's Capital Punishment Scale. / 
Although little research has been conducted on the 
development of just world beliefs, there is some evidence in 
regard to correlates with adult attitudes. Rubin and Peplau 
(1973) developed a Just World Scale (JWS) and found a corre-
lation of .56 between JWS scores and a 10-item version of 
the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950). They also cite Lerner 
who found a .20 correlation and Zuckerman who found a .35 
correlation with other versions of the F-scale. 
The belief in a just world is a major component of most 
Western religions. Therefore relatively religious people 
should score· high on the JWS. Rubin and Peplau (1973) found 
college students' JWS scores were positively correlated 
(.42) with church attendance. JWS scores were also corre-
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lated with belief in an active God (.31). Rubin and Peplau 
report that no significant differences were found in males' 
and females' scores. The authors also discuss the relation-
ship between just world belief and trust, the Protestant 
ethic, locus of control, and social class. 
Attribution 
Walster (1966) investigated two related propositions: 
(a) The worse the consequences of an accident, the greater 
the tendency for subjects to assign responsibility to 
someone and (b) A victim of an accident will be assigned 
increasing responsibility as severity increases. Male and 
female psychology students listened to tape-recorded des-
criptions of an automobile accident in which the potentially 
responsible person suffered inconsequential or considerable 
damage, and other persons suffered inconsequential or severe 
damages. Results clearly indicated that more responsibility 
was assigned to the victim (the car owner) when the accident 
was severe than when it was inconsequential, regardless of 
whether other unresponsible people were involved or not. 
Females assigned more responsibility as the potential conse-
quences increased, although males did not. In at least one 
condition, it is confusing as to who the actual victim was. 
In the scenario, a car rolls down a hill into a grocery 
store, supposedly victimizing the store owner, but also the 
car owner. Thus it is difficult to determine, as Walster 
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hoped to do, if responsibility will be assigned to a respon-
sible "nonvictim" (the car owner). 
To investigate the perceptual association between 
reward and virtue, Lerner (1965) had female subjects observe 
two males working together at a task. Subjects were aware 
that one of the two had been randomly chosen to be paid for 
his efforts whereas the other was to get nothing. A pretest 
showed that one worker was consistently rated as more 
attractive by the female subjects. 
Although both males were perceived as contributing more 
than the other when paid, the more attractive worker was 
seen as contributing significantly more than the less 
attractive worker. Also, when the worker's ratings were 
combined, the two together were seen as contributing less 
when the unattractive worker was paid than when the attrac-
tive one was paid. The findings therefore support the idea 
that a person takes into account the outcome of social 
events when attempting to make sense out of what he has 
observed, apparently even when chance circumstances are 
involved. 
People deserve what happens to them .••• It is 
more comfortable to believe that people ••• 
earned their condition by some personal failing 
than to believe that deprived people are fortui-
tous victims (Lerner, 1965, p. 360). 
In- a follow-up study (Lerner & Simmons, 1966), subjects 
observed a peer victim apparently receiving painful electric 
shocks (negative reinforcement) for errors in a paired-asso-
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ciate learning task. In one condition, subjects could com-
pensate the victim by reassigning her to a reward condition 
in \-Jhich she would be paid rather than shocked. Nearly all 
subjects took the opportunity to do so--thus justice was 
restored to the situation. In another condition, subjects 
could not reward the victim and were led to believe that her 
suffering was to continue. These latter subjects rated the 
victim significantly less favorably than the former reward 
subjects. Apparently subjects in the latter condition felt 
the victim somehow deserved her fate. 
A surprising amount of rejection took place in the 
"martyr" condition, where subjects were led to believe the 
victim was continuing merely so that they would receive 
their bonus participation points. Apparently the martyr's 
suffering threatens a person's need to believe in a just and 
good world more than suffering by less noble people. 
Additionally it was found that some subjects derogated 
the experiment rather than the victim. Why this occurred, 
Lerner and Simmons found difficult to pinpoint. But, it 
does indicate that not all people indiscriminately relate 
outcome and personal virtue. 
Rubin and Peplau (1975) wrote, "It is clear that not 
all people tend to react in this way" (p. 68). In addition 
to possible situational variations they propose relatively 
enduring individual differences in the extent to which peo-
ple believe outcomes and worth are related. Therefore Rubin 
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and Peplau developed a paper-and-pencil Just World Scale 
(JWS) to measure individual variations. The scale includes 
items on just world beliefs in regard to health, politics, 
criminal justice, family, school, etc. 
Before the 1971 national draft lottery, Rubin and 
Peplau (1973) gave the JWS to a group of 19-year-old males 
who later listened to the lottery and rated each other on 
several dimensions. Most subjects showed greater sympathy 
and liking and less resentment toward "losers" of the lot-
tery (those with high-priority numbers--in actuality, a low 
number) than toward "winners." However, those with high JWS 
scores resented losers more than winners. Disparagement of 
an innocent victim seems an unusual reaction, but is exactly 
what is to be expected of people who see victimization in 
terms of underlying personal worth. This pattern seemed to 
hold regardless of the subjects' own fate in the lottery. 
Shaver (1970) conducted three related studies to assess 
how an observer attributes responsibility for an accident. 
Subjects read descriptions of an automobile accident (based 
on Walster, 1966) in Experiments 1 and 2 and a scientific 
demonstration accident in Experiment 3. Across experimental 
situations results indicated that increased probability of 
occurence (especially when defined as high personal similar-
ity to ·the per~etrator) decreased responsibility attribu-
tions and increased attributions of carefulness to the 
perpetrator. It appeared that avoidance of blame was more 
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relevant to subjects than avoidance of the accident itself. 
As Shaver wrote: 
Assign responsibility when personal similarity is 
low, secure in the knowledge that as a different 
kind of person, you are safe. When personal simi-
larity is high, attribute the accident to unfortu-
nate, but unavoidable circumstances (p. 108). 
Results across experiments consistently failed to replicate 
Walster's (1966) finding of severity-dependent responsibil-
ity attributions, although this type of attribution would 
appear to be consistent with legal and moral tradition. 
Shaver notes that when the subject is alerted to an attribu-
tion task, severity-dependent attributions may be sup-
pressed. 
Shaver proposed a category of perceiver response he 
calls "defensive attribution" to characterize the tendency 
toward motivated attributional errors such as self-protec-
tion. Defensive attribution can occur when either 
psychological or physical safety is threatened. When the 
perceiver is concerned about having caused pain to others, 
as in Shaver's study, chance is the preferred responsibility 
attribution. But when the perceiver is a potential victim, 
He can be sure of his own personal worth and can 
be confident that his behavior will be correct, so 
chance becomes the least controllable, and there-
fore most threatening, cause of suffering. For 
this reason, chance is the cause that must be 
denied (p. 113). 
Thus, Shaver maintains that the bel.ief in a just and orderly 
world is apparently an example of defensive attribution, and 
not an all-pervasive belief, although the present results do 
not distinguish between the two. 
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A study by Chaikin and Darley (1973) investigated 
responsibility attributions by manipulating severity of 
consequences and identification with either the victim or 
the perpetrator. Subjects viewed a videotape of a two-per-
son group working on a task. An accident occurred which was 
initiated by the "supervisor" and had negative consequences 
(mild or severe) for the "worker ... The subject was told 
that he would later work on the task, thus making either the 
victim or the perpetrator situationally relevant. 
Results showed that the more severe the consequences, 
the less responsibility attributed to chance. Perpetrator-
relevant subjects attributed responsibility to avoid per-
sonal blame and derogated the victim of a severe accident. 
Victim-relevant subjects acted to avoid future harm and did 
not derogate victims. Thus results are consistent with both 
Shaver's (1970) defensive attribution hypothesis and Wal-
ster's (1966) and Lerner's (1965) hypothesized need to 
believe in an orderly, predictable world. The authors, how-
ever, write that "where defensive attributition considera-
tions conflict with some of the specifics of the just world 
hypothesis, defensive attrribution seems to predominate" (p. 
273). For example, in the future worker-severe consequence 
condition, the just world hypothesis says that the victim of 
the accident should be derogated. But defensive attribution 
suggests that potential victims would not devalue the vic-
tim--that is personally threatening. Data indicated that 
only future supervisors reported disliking the worker. 
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Chaikin and Darley note several ambiguities in the 
data. Subjects may have misunderstood or gone beyond the 
instructions. Or, watching the videotape, subjects may have 
developed a certain set in regard to blame, knowing that the 
tape was not of a "chance" occurrence. Also, the "severe" 
condition was marked by the victim's loss of less than two 
dollars. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Interest in Jury trials and jury behavior has been pre-
velant since the very beginning of our nation. Throughout 
the years, a great deal of folklore has developed regarding 
various jury characteristics, and in the early part of this 
century, various writers passed this questionably valid 
information along as immutable fact. 
The first and most ambitious jury research undertaken 
was the Chicago Jury Project which studied a series of real 
trials in Wichita, Kansas in the 1950's. Legal and beha-
vioral scientists combined efforts to investigate variables 
such as juror status, sex, communication patterns, choice of 
foreman, evidence recall, and judge/jury disagreements. The 
Chicago Jury Project provided a much-needed look inside the 
jury, led to production of a great deal of research 
(Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956; Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 
1957; James, 1959; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; among others), and 
assisted other researchers in formulating further empirical 
enquiries. 
However, in order to discover just what occurs when a 
jury is reaching a decision, the researchers (with full per-
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mission) bugged jury deliberation rooms. While a great deal 
of valuable information resulted, a public furor arose over 
this practice. Senate hearings ensued and efforts by sev-
eral groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, 
were successful in raising several constitutional points. 
Subsequently, federal laws were passed in order to prevent 
future occurrences and to preserve the constitutionally-
based sanctity of the trial jury. It is now illegal to 
observe, listen to, or record grand or petit jury delibera-
tions, and no similar studies have since been attempted. 
Thus, even today most legal practitioners' information in 
regard to jury behavior remains anecdotal. 
Most practitioners have neither time nor adequate 
training to systematically investigate the many phenomena 
that may influence a jury verdict. And potential investiga-
tions by social scientists are limited by the restricted 
access to actual juries. The research possibilities that 
remain are: 
1. A recreation of a trial can be attempted based on 
post-trial interviews with the judge, attorneys, and jurors. 
Because each trial is a distinct entity, the researcher may 
make only limited generalizations to other trials. 
2. "Shadow" juries may be created from excused and 
unselected jurors. These "jurors" view the trial, from the 
gallery and deliberate upon conclusion of evidence presenta-
tion. The verdicts of the actual and shadow juries can be 
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compared and additional data may be gathered from the shadow 
jury both before and after the trial. The obvious problem 
with the shadow jury is finding volunteers to sit through 
the several days of the actual trial. Of course, shadow 
jurors could be paid for their services, but this is gener-
ally outside the scope of the average research project. 
Another problem is the lack of control the researcher has 
over the experimental stimuli and the potential confounding 
of results. For example, when a real or a- shadow jury 
returns a guilty verdict, is it due to some characteristic 
of the jurors, or is it that the defendant was obviously 
guilty? 
3. Research can be conducted using mock trials and mock 
jurors, usually college students. There are obvious draw-
backs with the student population in terms of life experi-
ence, age, education, and so on. And probably no written or 
videotaped version of a trial fully captures the drama of a 
courtroom battle. However, the researcher is able to pre-
test the trial so that evidence is ambiguous or purposely 
biased. 
It would seem that the logical procedure is to attempt 
to discover some of the basic factors influencing the ver-
dicts of mock jurors viewing a mock trial before attempting 
to delineate more complex phenomena in a real trial with 
real jurors. The time, expenses, and tensions are just too 
great to conduct exploratory studies in real courts using 
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real jurors. But this should be the eventual goal of most 
researchers interested in jury behavior. 
Much of the reviewed research has shown that many 
extra-evidential factors may potentially influence a jury's 
verdict. For example, some subject/jurors may be predis-
posed to return certain verdicts and punishments. Mossman 
(1973) advocates the "careful examination of all prospective 
jurors, because jurors do not come into the courtroom with 
minds like blank pages to be filled with evidence and law" 
(p. 78). The problem of jurors' normal psychological ten-
dencies has received added attention in recent years with 
the Supreme Court's reimposition of the death penalty, and 
three subsequent executions. In "Witherspoon vs. Illinois" 
the Supreme Court ruled on the selection of·capital trial 
jurors. In Illinois, jurors with scruples against capital 
punishment were systematically excluded from service. 
"Witherspoon" said that jurors with reservations about the 
death penalty could not be excluded unless it was demons-
trated that they were unwilling to equally consider both 
life and death sentences. The Court overturned defendant 
Witherspoon's death sentence, but let his conviction stand. 
As Justice Stewart wrote in the majority opinion, 
We simply cannot conclude, ••• that the exclu-
sion of jurors opposed to capital punishment 
results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue 
of guilt or substantially increases the risk of 
conviction (p. 517-518). 
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With Jurow's (1971) and Boehm's (1968) findings that jurors 
who can inflict the death penalty are also conviction-prone, 
Mossman's advice becomes increasingly salient. 
Suggs and Sales (1979) titled their critical review of 
systematic jury selection procedures "Jury Selection: An 
Art or a Science?" As most would agree, jury selection 
remains mostly art. Few researchers appear willing to 
change this state of affairs. As a starting point, basic 
empirical research with mock jurors is indicated. Only when 
a sound body of empirical data is developed will research 
advance on more complex jury processes, and make it possible 
for systematic jury selection to move from the realm of art 
to that of science. 
Obviously, in an actual court trial, jurors must inter-
act with each other during the deliberation phase and 
attempt to reach an unanimous verdict. Never do actual 
jurors return individual verdicts. However, it would seem 
that to eventually increase knowledge of jury processes and 
jury selection, research should first concentrate on some of 
the many variables that may affect an individual juror's 
attribution of guilt or innocence. 
Therefore, the present study will investigate several 
variables that may significantly contribute to an individual 
juror's verdict and imposition of sentence. Additionally, 
subjects will be asked the standard death penalty questions 
that should, according to the Supreme Court in "Witherspoon 
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vs. Illinois" (1973), be asked of potential jurors in all 
capital trials. 
Multiple regression will be used to analyze the fol-
lowing variables: 
Predictor Variables: Criterion Variables: 
Verdict Legal Attitudes Questionnaire 
Just World Scale 
Capital Punishment Scale 
Punishment of Criminals Scale 
Severity of Crime 
(Guilty or Not Guilty) 
Sentence 
Sex of Subject 
"Witherspoon" response 
(Assault: # of years 
Murder: life or death) 
Based on a review of the literature, the following 
hypotheses are proposed. 
Verdicts will vary as a function of: 
I. LAQ scores 
A. authoritarianism is a predictor of guilty verdicts 
B. equalitarianism is not a predictor of verdicts 
c. anti-authoritarianism is a predictor of not guilty 
verdicts 
II. Just World (JW) belief 
A. high JW belief is a predictor of guilty verdicts 
B. low JW belief is a predictor of not guilty verdicts 
III. Punishment of Criminals Scale (PCS) 
A. high PCS is a predictor of guilty verdicts 
B. low PCS is a predictor of not guilty verdicts 
IV. Capital Punishment. Scale (CPS) 
A. high CPS is a predictor of guilty verdicts 
B. low CPS is a predictor of not guilty verdicts 
V. Verdicts will not vary as a function of severity of 
crime 
Sentence will vary as a function of 
VI. LAQ scores 
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A. authoritarianism is a predictor of severe sentences 
a) murder: more death penalties 
b) assault: more years 
B. equalitarianism is not a predictor of sentence 
C. anti-authoritarianism is a predictor of less 
severe sentences 
Additionally, subjects will respond to items measuring 
attributions of victim suffering; victim, defendant, and 
circumstantial responsibility; and victim and defendant 
similarity. Although no formal hypotheses are proposed, the 
present study appears to provide a test of alternative 
hypotheses--belief in a just world and defensive attribu-
tion--in regards to attributions made by mock jurors. If 





Th~ subjects were 170 male and female undergraduate 
psychology students who received bonus points for partici-
pating. They were recruited in introductory psychology 
classes for a research project titled "Jury Study." 
Stimulus Materials 
Response Booklet 
Each subject was given a computer-formated and printed 
response booklet. The first part of the booklet contained 
the voir dire oath, juror qualifications, and four attitude 
scales. 
Juror Qualifications 
Subjects initially read a "Voir Dire Oath" and sign 
their name. They then responded to a written set of 
"yes/no" juror qualification questions somewhat analogous to 
the voir dire. These items were designed to assess if the 
appropriate statutory requirements such as age and residency 
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\,le re met. The stand c: rd "Wither spoon" death penalty que s-
tions were asked in both conditions. 
)\ttitude Scnles 
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Subjects were asked to respond to a set of four atti-
tude scal~s. These were Boehm's (1968) Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire, Rubin and Peplau's (1973) Just World Seal~, 
Thurstone's (1932) Attitude Toward Capital Punishment Scale,-
and Thurstone's (1932) Attitude Toward Punishment of Crimi-
nals Scale. The order of presentation of these scales was 
randomized. 
Legal Attitudes Questionnaire. This scale measures 
authoritarian legal attitudes and provides scores for three 
subscales: authoritarianism, equalitarianism, and anti-au-
thoritarianism. The scale consists of 30 items arranged in 
10 groups of 3 items each. Subjects are asked to indicate 
which item in each triad they agree with most and which item 
they agree with least. Each triad consists of one item each 
from the authoritarian, equalitarian, and anti-authoritarian 
subscales. "Agree most" items earn three points, "agree 
least" items one point, and the other item in each group, 
two points. Scores on the three subscales are interdepen-
dent. Total score for the subscales combined always equals 
60. Raw scores on the subscales will be standardized for 
data analysis. (See Appendix B.) 
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Just World Scale. This scale, based on research by 
Lerner (1965; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) consists of 20 items, 
half scored positively, half negatively. Subjects indicate 
agreement or disagreement with each item on a scale from "lu 
(strongly disagree) to "6" (strongly agree). Individual 
items are summed for the total just world score. The range 
of scores is from 20 to 120. (See Appendix C.) 
Attitude To\vard Caoital Punishment. This 24-item scale 
measures attitude toward capital punishment in general. 
Items r~nge from advocating capital punishment for all cri-
minals to items which reject capital punishment altogether. 
Subjects respond by indicating agreement disagreement. An 
individual's score is the median of the scale values of the 
i terns with which he/she agreed. High scores indicate strong 
belief in capital punishment. (See Appendix D.) 
Attitude Toward Punishment of Criminals Scale. This 
34-item scale is concerned with the purpose of and appropri-
ate use of punishment, as well as with the question of 
whether or not to punish criminals at all. Subjects indi-
cate agreement or disagreement with each item. The indivi-
dual's score is the median of the scale values of the items 
with which he/she agreed. High scores indicate a strong 
belief in the value of punishing criminals. Wang and Thur-
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stone developed high school and college forms of the scale. 
The college form was used in the present study. (See Appen-
dix E.) 
Juror Decision Forms 
After the trial, subjects completed their response 
booklet. They were asked to {a) indicate their individual 
verdict (guilty or not guilty), (b) assign a sentence allow-
able in Oklahoma upon a guilty verdict (murder: life 
imprisonment or execution; assault: 0-5 years in the state 
penitentiary), {c) briefly list the factors that led to 
their verdict, and {d) respond to six attribution items. 
The attribution items included victim suffering; victim, 
defendant, and circumstance responsibility; and victim and 
defendant personal similarity. {See Appendix A.) 
Mock Trials 
Two black-and-white videotaped mock trials were pre-
pared: (a) a murder trial, and (b) assault with intent to 
kill. Both were approximately 35 minutes long and were 
exactly the same except for testimony by a doctor which 
indicated either (a) that the victim had been stabbed to 
death or (b) that he had been severely beaten, but had 
lived. In both tapes, the prosecuting· attorney examined (a) 
an eyewitness, (b) her husband, (c) the state medical exam-
iner, and (d) the bartender at a bar where an argument bet-
56 
ween the victim and defendant allegedly occurred. The 
defense attorney examined (a) a medical researcher, (b) a 
person in the bar, and (c) the defendant. Both attorneys 
cross-examined the other's witnesses. After conclusion of 
testimony presentation, the judge read instructions to the 
jury which included the definition of murder or assault with 
intent to kill. In order that subjects' verdicts would be 
based on presented testimony, rather than attorney skill, 
persuasiveness, etc., no opening or closing statements or 
objections were included on the videotape. Evidence pre-
sented in the mock trial was designed to be ambiguous. Sev-
eral pretests of the trial evidence were conducted with 
written transcripts in order that guilty and not guilty ver-
dicts would be approximately evenly distributed. 
The trial was videotaped in a mock courtroom con-
structed in the psychology laboratories at Oklahoma State 
University. The scene taped was of an attorney standing at 
a podium on the left, interviewing a witness in the witness 
box, on the right. The judge could be seen at the bench 
between the attorney and witness. 
Procedure 
Subjects were recruited from introductory psychology 
classes to participate in a "Jury Study." Experimental 
sessions were conducted with 6-12 subjects present. Upon 
arrival, subjects completed to the "Juror Qualifications" 
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questions and the four attitude scales. This lasted approx-
imately 20 minutes. When all present had completed these 
instruments, the trial started. Subjects were informed this 
was a highly-edited tape of a trial--only the relevant tes-
timony had been included, with irrelevant testimony, objec-
tions, opening and closing statements, etc., edited from the 
tape. Subjects were asked not to take notes, not to discuss 
the trial among themselves, and to save any questions until 
completion of the tape. Each trial lasted approximately 35 
minutes. 
When the trial ended, subjects completed their response 
booklets. Once again, they were instructed not to discuss 
the trial among themselves, but rather to return individual 
verdicts. Approximately 15 minutes were necessary for com-
pletion of the verdict, sentence, verdict reasons, and 
attribution items. 
Subjects then returned the booklets to the experimenter 
who answered questions about the experiment and debriefed 
them. A pledge of secrecy was obtained. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The primary data analyses were conducted with a step-
wise multiple regression analysis (Draper & Smith, 1956). 
The predictor variables were subjects' scores on four a~ti­
tude scales in addition to severity of crime, "Witherspoon" 
response, and subjects' sex. The four scales were (u) Legal 
Attitudes Questionnaire (Boehm, 1968), (b) Just World Scale 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973), (a) Attitude Toward Capital 
Punishment Scale (Thurstone, 1932), and (d) Attitude Toward 
Punishment of Criminals Scale Ovang & Thurstone, 1932). 
C r i t e r ion varia b 1 e s inc l ud ed ( a) v e r d i c t , { b) sentence , and 
(c) responsibility attributions. 
Stepwise regression examines each independent variable 
individually and identifies the one variable that accounts 
for the most variance ( R-squa re) in the dependent variable. 
Each remaining predictor variable is then examined to deter-
mine which yields the greatest improvement in R-square when 
added to the first variable. In this manner, the best two-
variable model is identified. Remaining predictor variables 
which account for significant amounts of variance ar~ then 
added one by one, producing the best three-variable model, 
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the best four-variable model, and so on. At each step the 
best model may be found by dropping a previous variable and 
substituting anoth~c. Thus, at each step the ••best" model 
is created, regardless of which variables were included in 
the previous steps. 
Additionally, t-tests and correlations were computed 
when appropriate. Results will be reported for murder, 
assault, and overall verdicts, murder and assault sentences, 
and the attribution items. 
Verdicts 
Overall 
The overall conviction rate for the experiment was 
44.4% (56/126). For murder, the conviction rate was 47.1% 
(32/68); for assault, the rate was 41.4% (24/58). Thus, 
evidence for both trials was sufficiently ambiguous. Con-
viction rates for the two crimes were not significantly dif-
ferent, ! = -.64, df = 124, ns. This supports Hypothesis v. 
The stepwise regression analysis indicated that the 
Capital Punishment Scale (CPS) was the single best predictor 
of verdicts, regardless of crime, ! (1, 122) = 10.29, E < 
.002. High CPS scores were associated with guilty verdicts 
and low CPS scores with not guilty verdicts, £ = -.28. This 
finding supports Hypothesis IV. However, the CPS score 
accounted for only 7. 7% of the variance (R-square) in ver-
dicts. When considered with CPS, no other variable contri-
buted a significant improvement in R-square. The analysis 
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indicated that the Punishment of Criminals Scale (PCS) 
yielded the largest improvement in R-square when considered 
with CPS, F (1, 121) = 2.55, E < .12. Guilty verdicts were 
associated with strong belief in the value of punishing cri-
minals, not guilty verdicts with weaker beliefs, ! = -.23. 
The two-variable regression model remained significant, F 
(2, 121) = S.48, p < .003, and accounted for 9.7% of the 
variance. Although results are in the expected direction, 
Hypothesis III therefore was not supported. Hypotheses I-A, 
I-C, and II also were not supported by the data. The autho-
ritarian and anti-authoritarian subscales of the LAQ and the 
Just World Scale were found to have no significant predicta-
bility for overall verdicts. No verdict predictability was 
expected for the equalitarian subscale, lending some support 
to Hypothesis I-B. 
Thus, for overall verdicts, predictive ability was 
weak. The best predictive ability was gained through know-
ledge of a subject's score on the Capital Punishment Scale. 
Sex of juror did not significantly affect verdicts, ! = 
-.85, df = 124, ns; nor, as previously reported, did the 
type of crime, ! = -.64, df = 124, ns. Thus, males' and 
females' verdicts were distributed equallly for both murder 
and assault cases. Subjects' verdicts affected several of 
the post-verdict attribution items. 
Subjects who voted guilty attributed significantly more 
v i c tim s u f f e ring , t = 2 • 9 4 , d f = 12 0 , E < • 0 0 4 ; 1 e s s v i c tim 
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responsibility, ! = -2.24, df = 120, E < .03; and more 
defendant responsibility, ! = 16.30, df = 111, p < .0001; 
than subjects who voted not guilty. No differences were 
found for circumstantial responsibility,!= .57, df = 120, 
ns, or victim similarity, ! = -.38, df = 120, ns. However, 
defendant similarity approached significance, t = -1.82 , df 
= 120, £ < .08, with more personal similarity attributed to 
the defendant by jurors who voted not guilty. 
Murder 
The murder defendant was convicted by 47.1% of the sub-
jects. As previously reported, this was not significantly 
different from the conviction rate for assault, t = -.64, df 
= 124, ns. 
Stepwise regression analysis for the murder case indi-
cated that the Capital Punishment Scale (CPS) was the single 
best predictor of verdicts, F (1, 66) = 10.41, E < .002. 
Relatively strong belief in capital punishment was associ-
ated with guilty verdicts, weaker belief with not guilty 
verdicts, r = -.37. This is in support of Hypothesis IV. A 
juror's degree of belief in capital punishment accounted for 
13.n% of the variance in murder verdicts. No other predic-
tor variable contributed a significant improvement in 
R-square, when added to CPS. The regression analysis indi-
cated that subjects' response to the "Witherspoon" death 
penalty question yielded the largest improvement in variance 
accounted for, when paired with CPS, F (1, 65) = 1.27, 
1)2 
R < .27. Subjects who indicated they would not be harmed by 
inflicting the death penalty tended to vote guilty, r = .12. 
This variable improved R-square to 15.3%. Although the 
model remained significant for both variables, F (2, h5) = 
5.86, E < .005, the best predictive ability for murder ver-
dicts t.·Jas gained merely through knowledge of subjects' Capi-
tal Punishment Scale scores. Thus, Hypotheses I-A, I-C, II, 
and III were not supported for murder verdicts. No predict-
ability was expected for the equalitarian subscale of the 
LAQ, lending support to Hypothesis I-B. 
Because of the nonsignificant regression data, no sig-
nificant t-tests would be expected. Since Boehm's data 
indicated the direction of authoritarians' and anti-authori-
tarians' verdicts, however, one-tailed t-tests were computed 
for these LAQ subscales. No significant differences were 
found between subjects' verdicts on authoritarianism, ! 
(124) = .91, ns, or anti-authoritarianism, t (124) = .60, 
ns. Since Boehm did not indicate verdict direction for 
equalitarians, a two-tailed t-test was computed. This com-
parison was nonsignificant, ! (124) = .60, ns. 
T-tests indicated that several attribution items were 
affected by a subject's verdict. Significantly greater res-
ponsibility was attributed to the defendant by subjects vot-
ing guilty (~ = 7.94) than by jurors who voted not guilty (M 
= 2.60), _! (64) = 14. 72, E.< .0001. Mean differences for 
attributions of victim responsibility were borderline signi-
ficant, ! (64) = -1.92, £ < .06. The victim was seen as 
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somewhat more responsible for his fate by subjects who voted 
not guilty (M = 4.31) than by those who voted guilty (~ = 
3.35). Although all subjects attributed little similarity 
to the defendant, relatively more similarity was perceived 
by subjects voting not guilty (M = 2.63) than by those vot-
ing g u i 1 t y ( M = 1 . 4 2) , ! (55. 1) = -3 • 2 0 , _e < • 0 0 3. r-1e an 
differences for victim suffering, circumstantial responsi-
bility, and victim similarity did not achieve statistical 
significance. 
Assault 
The assault defendant was convicted by 41.4% (24/58) 
subjects. This was not significantly different from the 
conviction rate for murder,! (124) = -.64, ns. For assault 
verdicts, the Punishment of Criminals Scale (PCS) was the 
single best predictor variable, but was only marginally sig-
nificant! (1,54) = 3.83, _e < .06. PCS score accounted for 
6.6% of the variation in assault verdicts. Relatively 
strong belief in the punishment of criminals was associated 
with guilt verdicts, r = -.26. This finding therefore pro-
vides some support for Hypothesis III. 
The anti-authoritarian subscale of the LAQ contributed 
the next largest, although nonsignificant, improvement in 
R-square, ! (1,53) = 1.29, p < .27, with anti-authoritarians 
tending to vote guilty. This finding, while nonsignificant, 
is opposite of the expected direction for anti-authoritar-
ianism, and does not support Hypothesis I-C. The t\vo-varia-
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ble regression model, F (2,53) = 2.57, p < .09, accounted 
for 8.8% of assault verdict variation. Thus, no independent 
variable achieved strong predictability, although the PCS 
was identified as the "best" variable for predicting assault 
verdicts. Hypotheses r~A, II, and IV also were not sup-
ported for assault verdicts. Because no predictability was 
expected for equalitarianism, Hypothesis I-B was supported. 
For assault, subjects' verdicts (1 = guilty, 2 = not 
guilty) were correlated with victim suffering,£= -.75, E < 
.0001. Thus, attributions of relatively greater victim suf-
fering and defendant responsibility were associated with 
guilty verdicts. The correlation of verdict with other 
attribution items did not achieve significance. 
Murder vs. Assault 
T-tests were computed comparing murder and assault 
verdicts. As previously reported, the two crimes did not 
differ on conviction rate, .!. (124) = -.64, ns, and no signi-
ficant differences were found for any independent variable. 
However, several attribution items were affected by the type 
of crime judged. Subjects attributed significantly more 
suffering to the victim (on a 9-point scale) in the murder 
case (~ = 7.32) than in the assault case (.!:! = 5.34),.!. (120) 
= 5.52, R < .0001. Also, relatively more responsibility was 
attributed to the victim in the assault case (~ = 4.84) than 
the murder case(~= 3.86),.!. (120) = -.27, ..E < .007. 
Attributions of responsibility to the defendant, t (120) = 
65 
-.77, ns, circumstances, ! (120) = -.02, ns, were not signi-
ficantly different for the two crimes. Additionally, sub-
jects perceived relatively greater similarity to the assault 
defendant (M = 2.84) than the murder defendant (~ = 2.06), t 
(120) = -2.40, E < .02, although means for both similarity 
attributions indicated subjects were generally dissimilar to 
the defendant. Assault subjects (M = 2.71) indicated 
somewhat greater similarity to the victim than murder 
subjects (~ = 2.26), although the comparison was 
nonsignificant, t (120) = -1.42, ns. 
Sentences 
Murder 
Only subjects who convicted the defendant assigned a 
sentence. Appropriate choices for murder were life impri-
sonment or the death penalty. Of the 32 subjects who 
convicted the murder defendant, 20 (62.5%) assigned a life 
sentence and 12 (37.5%) gave a death sentence. The single 
best predictor of murder sentence (coded 1 = life, 2 = 
death) was the equalitarian subscale of the Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire, F (1,30} = 7.89, p < .009. A high equalitar-
ianism score was associated with a lenient sentence (life) 
r = -.46. Equalitarianism accounted for 20.8% of murder 
sentence variance. Since no predictability was expected for 
equalitarianism, however, Hypothesis III-B was not sup-
ported. The Punishment of Criminals Scale (CPS) also signi-
ficantly contributed to the regression model, F (1,29) = 
4.87, p < .04, when considered with equalitarianism. Sub-
jects with relatively strong belief in the value of punish-
ing criminals tended to return life sentences, £ = -.14. 
The two-variable regression model was significant, F (2,29) 
= 6.88, p < .004. When considered together equalitarianism 
and PCS scores accounted for 32.2% of the variance in murder 
sentences. Response to the "Witherspoon" question addition-
ally contributed to an improvement in R-square, F (1,28} = 
6.76, p < .02, when considered with equalitarianism and PCS. 
Subjects who before the trial stated they could inflict the 
death penalty tended to do so,£= -.33. The three-variable 
regression model (equalitarianism, PCS, and Witherspoon),£. 
(3,28) = 7.75, E < .0006, accounted for 45.4% of murder sen-
tence variance. 
The regression analysis indicated that juror sex con-
tributed the next largest, although nonsignificant, improve-
ment in R-square, F (1,27) = 1.14, p < .30. Sex, when 
considered with the other variables, improved R-square 
minimally to 47.6% of sentence variation. Thus, the three 
variable model was indicated as best predicting a subject's 
murder sentence. The authoritarian and anti-authoritarian 
subscales of the LAQ were expected to be significant predic-
tors of sentences: Hypotheses VI-A and VI-C therefore were 
not supported. 
T-tests were computed comparing the attributions of 
jurors who gave life and death sentences. Those who 
returned a life sentence attributed relatively more personal 
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similarity to both the victim, ! (28) = 2.18, E < .04, and 
the defendant, ! (18) = 2.23, p < .04, than subjects return-
ing a death sentence. Actual attribution means indicated 
general dissimilarity to both victim and defendant, with the 
g r e a t e s t s i m il a r i t y ( M o f 2 . 7 9 on a 9 - po i n t s c a l e) a t t r i-
buted to the victim by those returing a life sentence. All 
subjects returning a death sentence attributed the absolute 
m in i m urn s i m i 1 a r i t y ( 1 • 0 on a 9 - po i n t s c a 1 e) to the d e fen-
dant. Mean differences were nonsignificant for attributions 
of victim suffering, and victim, defendant, and circumstan-
tial responsibility. 
Assault 
Subjects who convicted the assault defendant were asked 
. 
to return a sentence. The potential range was from 0-5 
years. The 24 subjects who convicted the assault defendant 
returned an average sentence of slightly less than 2 years, 
8 months (~ = 31.9 months, sd = 20.8 months) • The range was 
from 1 month to the maximum 5 years. The single best pred-
ictor of assault sentences was the Punishment of Criminals 
Scale (PCS), F (1,21) = 6.59, .E < .02. This variable 
accounted for 23.9% of sentence variance. High PCS scores 
were associated with relatively severe sentences, low scores 
with lenient sentences, E = .49. Anti-authoritarianism, 
considered with CPS, contributed the largest improvement in 
R-square, although nonsignificant, with high anti-authorita-
rians tending to assign more severe sentences, ! (1,20) = 
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.68, E < .42. This finding, while nonsignificant, is oppo-
site of that to be expected from Hypothesis VI-C. The model 
remained significant with these two variables, F (2,20) = 
3.59, E < .05. R-square accounted for 26.4% of the variance 
in assault sentence. Therefore, the PCS was identified as 
providing the best predictability for assault sentences. 
No attribution items were significantly correlated with 
assault sentence. Authoritarianism did not significantly 
predict assault sentence--thus, Hypothesis VI-A was not sup-
ported. However, since equalitarianism was not expected to 
be a significant predictor, some support was established for 
Hypothesis VI-B. 
Attribution 
Correlations were computed to identify the relation-
ships among the six attribution items and the other varia-
bles. Results will be reported for murder and assault 
cases, and for the two combined. 
Victim Suffering 
Attribution of victim suffering was correlated with the 
crime judged,£= -.45, df = 122~ E < .0001, with subjects 
in the murder case making attributions of relatively greater 
suffering than assault subjects. Victim suffering was also 
correlated with overall verdict (1 = guilty, 2 = not 
guilty), .E.= -.26, df = 122, p < .004, and assault verdicts, 
r = -.40, df = 56, E < .003. Subjects who voted guilty 
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tended to perceive greater suffering than those voting not 
guilty, especially in the assault case. Additionally, vic-
tim suffering and defendant responsibility were positively 
correlated for both crimes combined. r = .20, df = 122, p < 
.03, and for assault, ! = .43, df = 5G, £ < .0009. Espe-
cially in the assault case, the greater the degree of suf-
fering by the victim, the more likely the defendant was seen 
as responsible for the incident. However, for the murder 
case these correlations, and all others, were nonsignifi-
cant. 
Victim Responsibility 
Attribution of responsibility to the victim was signi-
ficantly correlated with subjects' overall verdicts, r = 
.20, df = 122, p < .03, and was borderline for murder ver-
dicts, ! = .23, df = 66, p < .06. Subjects returning a not 
guilty verdict tended to place more blame on the victim than 
subjects voting guilty. This relationship was not obtained 
for assault. The type of crime, however, was related to 
victim responsibility attributions, r = .24, df = 122, p < 
.007, with the victim perceived as being relatively more 
responsible for his fate in the assault case than in the 
murder case. Victim suffering significantly correlated with 
the authoritarian and equalitarian subscales of the LAQ, 
combined over both crimes,£= -.25, df = 122, p < .006; r = 
.31, df = 122, £ < .0005; respectively; and for the murder 
case, r = -.33, df = 66, E < .007; £ = .35, df = 66, p < 
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.005, respectively. These correlations were not significant 
for the assault case. Thus, subjects low on authoritarian-
ism and high on equalitarianism tended to attribute a rela-
tively high degree of responsibility to the victim for his 
own fate. (Authoritarianism and equalitarianism were highly 
correlated, .E.= -.65, df = 126, p < .0001.) Additionally, 
subjects who rated themselves as relatively similar to the 
defendant tended to place greater responsibility on the vic-
tim over both crimes, r = .18, df ~ 122, £ < .04, and in the 
murder case, .E.= .24, df = 66, p < .06. Circumstantial and 
victim responsibility were significantly correlated for both 
crimes, r = .18, df = 122, E < .05, and for assault, £ = 
• 3 3 , d f = 5 6 , E < • 0 2 • The g reate r " c i r c urns tan c e s" we r e 
seen as responsible for the incident, the greater the res-
ponsibility of the victim. This correlation was not signi-
ficant for the murder case. Victim responsibility was 
related to just world belief for subjects who voted not 
guilty, .E.= .27, df = 66, E < .03, but not for those who 
voted guilty, .E.= .01, df = 55, ns. Thus, only for subjects 
who acquitted, the stronger the belief in a just world, the 
more blame placed on the victim for the incident. 
Defendant Responsib;lity 
De fend ant responsibility was carrel a ted with overall 
verdicts, .E.= -.82, df = 122, £ < .0001; murder verdict, r = 
-.88, df = 66, p < .0001; and assault verdict, .E. = -.75, df 
= 56, ~ < .0001. Thus, guilt verdicts were clearly related 
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to strong attributions of responsibility to the defendant. 
Subjects' scores on the Capital Punishment Scale were signi-
ficantly related to attributions of defendant responsibility 
for both crimes combined, r = .26, df = 122, E < .005; and 
for murder, E = .45, df = 66, E < .0001. The correlation 
did not achieve significance for the assault case. Defen-
dant responsibility and victim suffering were related for 
both crimes, E = .20, df = 122, E < .03, and for assault, r 
= .43, df = 56, E < .0009, but not for murder,£= .14, df = 
66, ns. The correlation of defendant responsibility and 
defendant similarity was borderline significant over both 
crimes, E = -.17, df = 122, E < .06, and achieved signifi-
cance for murder, E = -.28, df = 66, E < .OJ. Thus, espe-
cially in the murder trial, subjects who rated themselves as 
relatively similar to the defendant attributed relatively 
little responsibility to him. Or conversely, when the 
defendant was seen as responsible for the incident, subjects 
did not perceive themselves as very similar to him. 
Circumstantial 
Attributions of responsibility to "circumstances" were 
found to be significantly correlated with subjects' Capital 
Punishment Scale score for both crimes, E = .18, df = 122, E 
< .05, and was borderline significant for the murder case, r 
= .23, df = 66, p < .07. Subjects with relatively strong 
beliefs in capital punishment tended to attribute somewhat 
more .. circumstantial" responsibility than subjects with 
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weaker beliefs. Circumstantial responsibility was also cor-
related with subjects' response to the "Witherspoon" death 
penalty question (1 = yes, 2 = no), .E.= -.17, df = 122, .E. < 
.07, for both crimes; r = -.24, df = 66, .E.< .05, for 
murder. As with the CPS, "pro" death penalty attitudes were 
related to relatively greater attributions of circumstantial 
responsibility, especially in the murder case. However, 
actual murder sentence \vas not correlated with circumstan-
tial responsibility, .E.= -.07, df =55, ns. Additionally, 
attributions of responsibility to the victim and circum-
stances were correlated for both crimes, .E.= .18, df = 122, 
p < .05, and for assault, .E.= .33, df =56, .E.< .02. The 
more responsibility attributed to circumstances, the more 
the victim was seen as also blameworthy, especially in the 
assault case. There was also a weak correlation in the 
assault case between circumstantial responsibility and sex 
(1 =male, 2 =female),.!.= -.22, df =56, .E < .10, indicat-
ing that males may have seen circumstances as more responsi-
bile for the "fight" than females. 
Victim Similarity 
Victim similarity and defendant similarity were 
strongly correlated for both cases combined, r = .48, df = 
12 2 E. < • 0 0 01 ; for murder , r = • 57, d f = 6 6 , .E < • 0 0 0 1 ; and 
for assault, .E.= .36, df = 56, p < .007. Means for victim 
and defendant similarity were virtually identical (2.47 and 
2.42, respectively) and in the direction of dissimilarity. 
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Possibly because bott1 the victim and the defendant had been 
drinking in a bar, subjects felt the victim and defendant 
were similar to each other, but were not very similar to 
themselves. 
For both crimes combined, victim similarity was border-
line significant with authoritarianism, ~ = -.19, df = 122, 
p < .08, and anti-authoritarianism, £ = .16, df = 122, E < 
.07. These correlations achieved significance for the 
murder case, £ = -.29, df = 66, p < .02; £ = .30, df = 66, E 
< .02, respectively. High authoritarians tended to perceive 
the victim as relatively dissimilar to themselves, whereas 
anti-authoritarians tended to perceive him as relatively 
similar. As would be expected, authoritarianism and anti-
authoritarianism were negativley related,£= -.38, df = 
122, p < .0001. The correlation of victim similarity and 
Capital Punishment Scale score was borderline significant 
for both crimes combined,~= -.17, df = 122, E < .06, and 
for murder,~= -.24, df = 66, E < .06. The stronger the 
belief in capital punishment, the less similarity attributed 
to the victim. The correlation of victim similarity and 
murder sentence was marginally significant, ~ = -.33, df = 
31, p < .07, with guilty verdicts associated with attribu-
tions of low similarity. For assault, there was also a weak 
correlation between victim similarity and defendant respon-
sibility, £ = -.23, df = 56, p < .09, such that the more 
similar subjects were to the victim, the less responsibility 
was placed on the defendant. 
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Defendant Similarity 
Subjects' attributions of defendant similarity were 
correlated with the crime judged {1 =murder, 2 =assault}, 
r = .21, df = 122, £ < .02, with more similarity attributed 
to the defendant in the assault case. Defendant similarity 
was also correlated with murder verdicts (1= guilty, 2 = not 
guilty}, r = .36, df = 66, _e < .003, and was borderline sig-
nificant for both cases combined,!= .16, df = 122, p < 
.08. Especially in the murder case, subjects voting not 
guilty perceived greater similarity to the defendant than 
subjects voting guilty. For murder, there was also a weak 
correlation of sentence (1= life, 2 = death} with defendant 
similarity,£= -.31, df = 31, E < .09, with subjects giving 
the death penalty tending to perceive relatively less 
similarity to the defendant than subjects giving a life 
sentence. Defendant similarity was correlated with authori-
tarianism for both crimes, r = -.19, df = 122, p < .04, and 
for murder, r = -.28, df = 66, .e < .03, and was borderline 
significant with anti-authoritarianism, r = .17, df 122, p < 
.06. Thus, the greater subjects' authoritarianism score, 
especially in the murder case, the less similarity attri-
buted to the defendant, whereas anti-authoritarianism was 
weakly related to attributions of relative similarity to the 
defendant. The correlation of defendant similarity and vic-
tim responsibility was significant over both cases, r = .18, 
df = 122, E < .05, and was borderline significant for 
murder, r = .24, df = 66, p < .06. This would indicate that 
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the greater subjects perceived similarity to the defendant, 
the more responsibility placed on the victim. Defendant 
similarity was also correlated with defendant responsibility 
for murder, r = -.28, df = 66, E < .03, and was borderline 
significant for both crimes combined,£= -.17, df = 122, £ 
< .06. The greater the responsibility of attribution to the 
defendant, the less similar subjects judged him to be. 
Victim and defendant similarity were strongly related 
overall, r = .48, df = 122, p < .0001; for murder, r = .57, 
df = 66, p < .0001; and for assault, £ = .36, df = 56, p < 
.007, indicating that the greater the similarity to the 
defendant, the greater the similarity to the victim. 
Additionally, capital punishment attitude was signifi-
cantly correlated with defendant similarity, £ = -.26, df = 
66, R < .04, but only for the murder case. The stronger the 
belief in capital punishment, the lower the attribution of 
similarity. 
Attitude Scales 
Because the four attitude scales were administered 
before the trial stimulus and there were no significant dif-
ferences between murder and assault for the scales, results 
will be reported for the two crimes combined. 
Legal Attitudes Questionnaire 
Because of the design of the LAQ, the subscales were 
highly intercorrelated (see Table I). 
TABLE I 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR LEGAL 









The authoritarian subscale was significantly related to 
Punishment of Criminals score, r = .19, df = 125, E < .04, 
and was borderline significant for capital punishme~t a~ti-
tude, £ = .17, df = 126, E < .06. The higher the level of 
authoritarianism, the more likely subjects were to agree 
with capital punishment and severe punishment in general. 
The equalitarian subscale was negatively related to 
punishment of criminals attitude,£= -.23, df = 125, £ < 
.01, indicating high equalitarians tended not to have strong 
punishment attitudes. Equalitarianism was borderline signi-
ficant for just world belief,£= .17, df = 125, £ < .07. 
The greater the degree of equalitarianism, the greater the 
belief in a just world. 
Anti-authoritarianism was not significantly related to 
any other attitude scale. 
Capital Punishment Scale and Punishment 
of Criminals Scale 
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These scales were strongly related,~= .34, df = 125, 
E < .0001, indicating that severe attitudes tended to coin-
cide. Both scales were related to authoritarianism, ~ = 
.17, elf= 12(), £ < .OS;~= .19, df = 126, £ < .04, respec-
tively. High authoritarians tended to be in favor of rela-
tively more severe treatment of criminals. 
Equalitarianism \vas significantly correlated with the 
Punishment of Criminals Scale, ~ = -.23, df = 125, p < .01, 
but not the Capital Punishment Scale, E = .08, df = 126, ns. 
Thus, high equalitarian scores were associated with lenient 
general punishment attitudes, but did not vary with capital 
punishment attitudes. 
Both scales were also related to subjects' 11 Wither-
s po on 11 response 1 ( l = y e s 1 2 = no ) r = - • 6 2 , d f = 1 2 6 , £ < 
.0001; E = -.29, df = 125, E < .001; respectively. Subjects 
who responded positively to the Supreme Court's death pen-
alty question, tended to have relatively severe punishment 
attitudes. 
Additionally, capital punishment attitude was related 
to subject sex (1 = male, 2 = female) when measured by the 
CPS, ~ = -.30, df = 126, p < .0006, and by the 11 Witherspoon 11 
question, E = .21, df = 126, £ < .02, although general pun-
ishment attitudes were not, E = .04, df = 125, ns. Females 
tended to have less favorable attitudes in regard to capital 
punishment, although murder verdicts were not related to 
sex, r = -.23, df = 32, ns. 
Just World Scale 
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Just world attitude was marginally correlated with 
equalitarianism, E = .17, df = 125, E < .07, and punishment 
of criminals attitude, £ = .17, df = 124, E < .07. Thus, 
relatively strong belief in a just world was related to high 
equalitarianism scores and strong belief in the value of 
punishing criminals. 
Just world belief was significantly correlated with 
victim responsibility for subjects who voted not guilty, r = 
.27, df = 66, p < .03, but not for those voting guilty, r = . - -
.en, df =55, ns. Thus, the stronger subjects' belief in a 
just world, the more likely the victim was blamed for his 
suffering, but only by subjects voting not guilty. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The evidence in both the assault and murder trials was 
weighted such that it was difficult to tell exactly what had 
occurred during the incident, yet either a guilty or not 
guilty verdict was realistically possible. The overall con-
viction rate {44.4%) indicated that the trial stimuli were 
sufficiently ambiguous. Altering some evidence in the 
murder trial to create the assault trial did not affect the 
conviction rate, nor did sex of juror. Thus, contrary to 
many other jury simulation studies, results of the present 
study are not mediated by strong sex effects or unevenly 
distributed verdicts. Most studies reporting sex differ-
ences involved a rape trial, and it is likely that this 
accounts for the effect. Although trial stimuli in the pre-
sent study were physical (non-sexual) assaults, they appar-
ently did not differentially affect males and females. 
Results for the attribution items indicated little sup-
port for just world attributions, but generally supported 
Shaver's notion of defensive attribution. Defendant respon-
sibility was negatively related to defendant similarity--the 
greater the defendant's responsibility, the less subjects 
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felt similar to him. This would seem to be a mechanism for 
avoiding personal blame: "He is responsible for someone's 
suffering and is therefore not like me. If I were to cause 
suffering, it would not be my fault." This relationship was 
somewhat stronger for murder than assault. Attributions of 
defendant responsibility therefore may be severity-depen-
dent. 
Severity-dependent attributions of victim responsibil-
ity were not found. Walster (1966) reported that as 
severity of consequences increased, attributions of victim 
responsibility increased. This is essentially a "just-
world" response--the victim has gotten what he deserved. In 
the present study, severity of consequences (defined as 
either degree of victim suffering or type of crime) was not 
. 
related to victim responsibility. 
However, Lerner (1965) indicated that just world behav-
iors are most likely to be exhibited when the agent of suf-
fering has not been identified. In the present study, 
nearly half of the subjects voted guilty--thus identifying 
the harm-doer and establishing justice. Those who voted not 
guilty were faced with a seemingly innocent yictim who had 
suffered at the hands of an unknown assailant. This is 
essentially the situation where just world behaviors should 
appear. Considering only subjects who acquitted the defen-
dant, severity-dependent attributions of victim responsibil-
ity were not found. 
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There is some evidence supporting the just world 
position. Just world belief wns not correlated with victim 
responsibility for jurors who convicted--justice was accom-
plished by the guilty verdict. But, for acquitting jurors, 
a high need to believe in a just world was related to rela-
tively high attributions of victim responsibility. Thus, 
when no agent of suffering had been identified, high just 
world jurors tended to derogate the victim by placing rela-
tively high responsibility for the incident on him. 
Based on the pattern of attribution results, it is 
believed that overall, defensive attribution explanations 
best account for the data. Defendant similarity and respon-
sibility were negatively related and severity-dependent 
attributions of victim responsibility were not found. As 
Shaver (1970) noted, belief in a just world is probably an 
example of defensive attribution. 
Overall predictability in the study was generally mini-
mal. Even when significant, most predictor variables 
accounted for little variance (R-square) in the dependent 
variable. The greatest improvement in R-square (45.4%) was 
found for the 3-variable model (equalitarianism, Punishment 
of Criminals Scale, and Witherspoon) for murder sentences, 
but the other four regression models each accounted for less 
than 25% of the variance. Statistical effects may have been 
strengthened by various methods; for example, using a 
7-point guilt continuum instead of the dichotomous one 
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employed; varying the defendant's characteristics, such as 
similarity, race, or age; using less ambiguous trial sti-
muli; or by having subjects deliberate. In a review of mock 
trial research, Bray and Kerr (1979) state that they 
are not persuaded that simulation studies must 
accurately establish the strength of Gn effect 
• or that their effects must account for a large 
proportion of the variance of actual jury behav-
ior •••• If our interest extends to the ability 
of juries to carry out their responsibilities, 
even small or infrequently applied juror biases 
may be important, particularly when they are based 
on extralegal factors or might be remedied through 
minor procedural safeguards (p. 116). 
Results for the LAQ subscales were disappointing. 
Boehm (1968), Jurow (1971), and Berg and Vidmar (1975) had 
reported the conviction proneness of authoritarians. 
Authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism afforded no sig-
nificant predictability for verdicts in the present study 
and contrary to expectation, anti-authoritarianism was mod-
erately related to severe sentences in the assault case. 
Because Boehm reported no results for equalitarianism in her 
study, it was not expected to be related to verdict or sen-
tence. However, the regression analyses indicated the 
"best" predictor of murder sentences was equalitarianism, 
with high equalitarians tending to give relatively lenient 
, sentences. This result seems logical if, as Boehm states, 
equalitarians tend to take "non-extreme positions on legal 
questions" (p. 734), such as returning a life sentence 
rather than the death penalty. 
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Based on Boehm's and Jurow's results, the LAQ seemed to 
hold promise for investigating potential juror biases: with 
the equalitarian subscale best predicting murder sentences, 
it is worthy of future investigation. It is possible that 
the LAQ may need revision. The scale was constructed during 
the late 1960's, using social psychology graduate students 
(apparently from Columbia University) and civil rights work-
ers as subjects, and may not be as valid for Oklahoma sub-
jects in the poliiically-conservative 1980's. 
Several LAQ authoritarianism items were "essentially 
punitive in nature" (Boehm, p. 734). As would be expected, 
high authoritarianism was related to strong belief in the 
need for punishing criminals. However, it was not signifi-
cantly related to actual sentences, although the results 
were in the expected direction. Attributions of both victim 
and defendant similarity were also related to authoritarian-
ism and anti-authoritarianism: Authoritarians tended to 
distinguish themselves from both victim and defendant, 
anti-authoritarians tended to identify with both. 
Thurstone's Capital Punishment Scale (1932) and Punish-
ment of Criminals Scale (1932) provided relatively good 
predictability. 
The Punishment of Criminals Scale was a significant 
predictor of both murder and assault sentences and was the 
"best., ( _e < .06} predictor of assault verdicts. Interest-
ingly, the Capital Punishment Scale did not significantly 
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predict murder sentences, but did predict murder end overall 
verdicts. This lends support to previous research which 
reports that jurors with strong capital punishment attitudes 
are conviction-prone. This effect, however, was not 
obtained for the assault trial. "Death-qualified" jurors 
are apparently not generally conviction-prone: In the pre-
sent study, this bias appears only when murder is the crime 
being judged. 
Although the Capital Punishment Scale was not one of 
the best predictors of murder sentences, the regression 
model did include the "Witherspoon" response. No subject 
who said inflicting the death penalty "would do violence to 
[my] conscience" returned a death sentence (n = 5). Sub-
jects who could give the death penalty were approximately 
equally likely to return life (n = 15) as death {n = 12). 
Although n's are small, this data indicates that jurors with 
reservations on capital punishment may not be able to set 
their opinions aside, regardless of whether they say they 
are able to or not. The Supreme Court's "Witherspoon" rul-
ing stated that persons with any scruples on capital punish-
ment could not be systematically excluded from service. 
However, these jurors can be dismissed if they are unwilling 
to consider equally both life and death sentences. The pre-
sent data tentatively suggest that even if these jurors 
claim to be able to consider both, they may not be capable 
of doing so. This seemingly contradicts Justice Stewart's 
majority opinion in "Witherspoon" which said 
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than 
one who favors it, can make the discretionary 
judgment entrusted to him by the State and can 
thus obey the oath he takes as a juror (to con-
sider both life and death sentence~ p. 519). 
Although Witherspoon responses did not significantly 
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contribute to the variance for overall verdicts, jurors with 
capital punishment scruples also were somewhat more likely 
to find the defendant innocent (£ < .10). 
These results hold implications for attorneys and psy-
chologists involved in jury selection. When defending a 
capital defendant, special emphasis should be placed on 
jurors who have capital punishment scruples, but are willing 
to consider both sentences. These jurors will probably be 
allowed to remain on the jury and may insure against a death 
sentence, or if excluded, may increase the chances of 
receiving one. Further research is needed to investigate if 
these results are mediated by a group deliberation or by 
defendant characteristics. 
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VOIR DIRE OATH 
DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR TO WELL AND TRULY ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS 
ASKED OF YOU CONCERNING YOUR QUALIFICATIONS TO SIT IN THE 
CASE NOW ON TRIAL, SO HELP YOU GOD? THIS I AFFIRM UNDER THE 
PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY. 
DATE SIGNED --------------- ---------------------------------
Both the State of Oklahoma and the defendant are 
entitled to jurors who approach this case with open minds 
and agree to keep their minds open until a verdict is 
reached. Jurors must be free as humanly possible from bias, 
prejudice, or sympathy. Jurors must not be influenced by 
pre-conceived ideas as to the facts or as to the law. 
YES NO 
JUROR QUALIFICATIONS 
(PLEASE CHECK APPROPRIATE ANSWER) 
1. Are you over 18 years of age? 
2. Are you a resident of Oklahoma? 
3. Have you ever been convicted of a 
felony? 
4. Are you or any relative of yours 
connected with law enforcement? 
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5. If selected as a juror, will you assess 
punishment in accordance with the law? 
6. If selected as a juror, will you 
presume the defendant innocent until 
proven guilty "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
7. If selected as a juror, in a case where 
the law and evidence warrant, can you, 
without doing violence to your 
conscience vote for and support a death 
penalty for a defendant in a case of 
murder in the first degree? 
IF * 7 IS NO, ANSWER # 8, THEN GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
IF # 7 IS YES, GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
8. Are your reservations about the death 
penalty such that regardless of the 
law, the facts, and circumstances of 
the case, you can not inflict the death 
penalty if you found "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that the defendant was 
guilty of murder in the first degree? 
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AFTER HEARING THE EVIDENCE, I HEREBY FIND THE DEFENDANT: 
GUILTY 
NOT GUILTY 
IF GUILTY, GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
IF NOT GUILTY, SKIP NEXT PAGE AND GO TO FOLLOWING PAGE. 
HAVING FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY, I HEREBY ASSESS 
THE PENALTY IN THIS CASE AS: 
YEARS, ---------- MONTHS IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE STATE PENITENTIARY. 
GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
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HAVING FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY, I HEREBY ASSESS 
THE PENALTY IN THIS CASE AS: 
LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY. -----
DEATH BY INJECTION. -----
GO TO NEXT PAGE. 
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PLEASE LIST IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE THE FACTORS THAT LED TO 
YOUR VERDICT OF GUILTY or NOT GUILTY (# 1 should be 






PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY PUTTING A 
CIRCLE AROUND THE DOT THAT BEST CORRESPONDS TO YOUR 
ESTIMATE. 





2. How responsible for· the incident is William Parks? 
Very 
little 













7. How similar are you to William Parks? 
Very 
little 









LEGAL ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE 
100 
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LEGAL ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS: On the following pages are ten groups of 
statements, each expressing a commonly held opinion about 
law enforcement, legal procedures and other things connected 
with the judicial system. There are 
three statements in each group. 
Put a plus (+) on the line next to the statement in a 
group that you agree with most, and a minus (-) next to the 
statement you agree with the least. 
An example of a set of statements might be: 
+ A. The failure of a defendant to testify in his own 




The majority of persons arrested are innocent of 
any crime. 
Giving an obviously guilty criminal a long drawn-
out trial is a waste of the tax-payer's money. 
In this example, the person answering has agreed most 
with statement A and least with statement c. 
Work carefully, choosing the item you agree with most and 
the one you agree with least in each set of statements. 
There is no time limit on this questionnaire, but do not 
spend too much time on any set of statements. Some sets are 
more difficult than others, but please do not omit any set 
of statements. 
SET 1 
A. Urfair treatment of underprivileged groups and 
classes is the chief cause of crime. 
B. Too many obviously guilty persons escape punish-
ment because of legal technicalities. 
C. The Supreme Court is, by and large, an effective 







A. Evidence obtained illegally should be udmissable 
in court if such evidence is the only wny of 
obtaining a conviction. 
B. Most prosecuting attorneys have a strong sadistic 
streak. 
C. Search warrants should clearly specify the person 
or things to be seized. 
A. No one should be convicted of a crime on the basis 
of circumstantial evidence, no matter how strong 
such evidence is. 
B. There is no need in a criminal case for the 
accused to prove his innocence beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 










When determining a person's guilt or innocence, 
the existence of a prior arrest record should not 
be considered. 
Wiretapping by anyone and for any reason should be 
completely illegal. 
A lot of recent Supreme Court decisions sound 
suspiciously Communistic. 
Treachery and deceit are common tools of 
prosecutors. 
Defendants in a criminal case should be required 
to take the witness stand. 
All too often, minority group members do not get 
fair trials. 
Because of the oppression and persecution minority 
group members suffer they deserve leniency and 
special treatment in the courts. 
Citizens need to be protected against excess 
police power as well as against criminals. 
Persons who testify in court against underworld 
characters should be allowed to do so anonymously 






A. It is better for society that several guilty men 
be freed than one innocent one wrongfully 
imprisoned. 
B. Accused persons should be required to take lie-
detector tests. 
c. When there is a "hung" jury in a criminal case, 
the defendant should always be freed and the 
indictment dismissed. 
A. A society with true freedom and equality for all 
would have very little crime. 
B. It is moral and ethical for a lawyer to represent 
a defendant in a criminal case even when he 
believes his client is guilty. 
C. Police should be allowed to arrest and question 
suspicious-looking persons to determine whether 
they have been up to something illegal. 
A. The law coddles criminals to the detriment of 
society. 
B. A lot of judges have connections with the under-
we r ld. 
C. The freedom of society is endangered as much-by 
overzealous law enforcement as by the acts of 
individual criminals. 
A. There is just about no such thing as an honest cop. 
B. In the long run, liberty is more important than 
order. 
C. Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the 
pol ice. 
APPENDIX C 
JUST WORLD SCALE 
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INSTRUCTIONS: The following statements 
common interpersonal and political theories. 
each statement and decide the degree to which 
disagree with the statement. 
deal with 
Please read 
you agree or 
In the blank space before each statement, place the 
number which best describes your reaction to each item. If 
you definitely disagree with an item, place a 1. If you 
disagree less strongly, place a 2. Place a 3 if you 
disagree slightly. Place a 4 if you agree slightly with the 
item. If you agree more strongly, place a 5 in the blank. 








There is no time limit on this questionnaire, 
not spend too much time 1 on any one statement. 
statements are more difficult than others, but please 
omit any statements. 
1. I've found that a person rarely deserves the 
reputation he has. 




3. People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned 
their good fortune. 
4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in 
traffic accidents as careless ones. 
5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to 
get off free in American courts. 
6. Students almost always deserve the grades they 
receive in school. 
7. Men who keep in shape have little chance of 
suffering a heart attack. 
8. The political candidate who sticks up for his 
principles rarely gets elected. 
9. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent 
to jail. 
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10. In professional sports, many fouls and infractions 
never get called by the referee. 
11. By and large, people deserve what they get. 
12. When parents punish their children, it is almost 
always for good reasons. 
13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. 
14. Although evil men may hold political power for a 
while, in the general course of history good wins out. 
15. In almost any business or profession, people who 
do their job well rise to the top. 
16 •. American _parents tend to overlook the things most 
to be admired in their children. 
17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a 
fair trial in the USA. 
18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought 
1t on themselves. 
19. Crime doesn't pay. 
20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of 
their own. 
APPENDIX D 
ATTITUDE TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SCALE 
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Below you will find a number of statements expressing 
different attitudes toward Capital Punishment. 
Put a plus (+) if you agree with the statement. 
Put a minus (-) if you disagree with the statement. 
1. Capital punishment may be wrong but it is the 
best preventative to crime. 
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2. Capital punishment is absolutely never justified. 
3. I think capital punishment is necessary but I 
wish it were not. 
4. Any person, man or woman, young or old, who 
commits murder, should pay with his own life. 
5. Capital punishment cannot be regarded as a sane 
method of dealing with crime. 
6. Capital punishment is wrong but is necessary in 
our imperfect civilization. 
7. Every criminal should be executed. 
8. Capital punishment has never been effective in 
preventing crime. 
9. I don't believe in capital punishment but I'm not 
sure it isn't necessary. 
10. We must have capital punishment for some crimes. 
11. I think the return of the whipping post \vould be 
more effective in preventing crime. 
12. I do not believe in capital punishment under any 
circumstances. 
13. Capital punishment is not necessary in modern 
civilization. 
14. We can't call ourselves civilized as long as we 
have capital punishment. 
15. Life imprisonment is more effective than capital 
punishment. 
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15. Execution of criminals is a disgrace to civilized 
society. 
17. CA.pital punishment is just and necessary. 
18. I do not believe in capital punishment but it is 
not practically advisable to abolish it. 
19. Capital punishment is the most hideous practice 
of our time. 
20. Capital punishment gives the criminal what he 
deserves. 
21. The state cannot teach the sacredness of human 
life by destroying it. 
22. It doesn't make any difference to me whether we 
have capital punishment or not. 
23. Capital punishment is justified only for pre 
meditated murder. 
24. Capital punishment should be used more often 
than it is. 
APPENDIX E 




Below are a number of statements regarding 
punishment/rehabilitation of criminals. 
Put a plus (+) if you AGREE with the statement. Put a minus 
(-) if you DISAGREE with the statement. 
1. A person should be imprisoned only for serious 
offenses. 
2. It is wrong for society to make any of its 
members suffer. 
3. Hard prison life will keep men from committing 
crime. 
4. Some criminals do not benefit from punishment. 
5. Most prisons are schools of crime. 
6. We should not consider the comfort of a prisoner. 
7. A criminal will go straight only when he finds 
that prison life is hard. 
8. No punishment can reduce crime. 
9. Prison influence is degenerating. 
10. Only habitual criminals should be punished. 
11. We should employ corporal punishment in dealing 
with all criminals. 
12. I have no opinion about the treatment of crime. 
13. Punishment of criminals is a disgrace to 
civilized society. 
14. Solitary confinement will make the criminal 
penitent. 
15. It is advantageous to society to spare certain 
criminals. 
16. Only humane treatment can cure criminals. 
17. Harsh imprisonment merely embitters a criminal. 
18. No leniency should be shown to convicts. 
19. Many petty offenders become dangerous criminals 
after a prison term. 
I 
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20. Failure to punish the criminal encourages crime. 
21. Only by extreme brutal punishment can we cure the 
criminal. 
22. The more severely a man is punished, the greater 
criminal he becomes. 
23. A criminal should be punished first and then 
reformed. 
24. One way to deter men from crime is to make them 
suffer. 
25. Punishment is wasteful of human life. 
26. A bread and water diet in prison will cure the 
criminal. 
27. Brutal treatment of a criminal makes him more 
dangerous. 
28. A jail sentence will cure many criminals of 
further offenses. 
29. Prison inmates should be put in irons. 
30. We should consider the individual in treating 
crime. 
31. Even the most vicious criminal should not be 
harmed. 
32. It is fair for society to punish those who offend 
it. 
33. Humane treatment inspires the criminal to be good. 






SUMMARY OF STEPWISE REGRESSION FOR OVERALL VERDICT 
Summary of Steps 
Variable 
Entered 
Simple Multiple Sequential 
Step R* R-square SS 
1 Cap. Pun. -.28 2.38 
Scale 
2 Pun. Crim. -.29 .10 • 58 
Scale 
Summary of One Variable Model 






























SUMMARY OF STEPWISE REGRESSION FOR MURDER VERDICT 
Variable 
Entered 
Summary of Steps 
Simple Multiple Sequential 
R* R-square SS F 
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p 






.12 .15 • 28 1. 27 
Summary of One Variable Model 









































Summary of Steps 
Simple Multiple Sequential 
R* R-square SS 
-.46 1.56 
-.14 -.32 .85 
-.33 -.45 .98 
-.23 -.48 .17 
Summary of Three Variable Model 



















































SUMMARY OF STEPWISE REGRESSION FOR ASSAULT VERDICT 
















Summary of One Variable Model 
















Pun. Crim. -.12 


















SUMMARY OF STEPWISE REGRESSION FOR ASSAULT SENTENCE 
Summary of Steps 
Variable 
Entered 
Simple Multiple Sequential 
Step R* R-square .SS 
1 Pun. Crim. .49 2380.34 
Scale 
2 Anti-au- .21 • 26 250.86 
thoritarianism 












































DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEANS FOR MURDER, ASSAULT, 
AND BOTH CRIMES COMBINED 
Variable 
Verdict 
(1 = guilty, 
2 =not guilty) 
Sentence 
(Murder: 1 = life, 
2 = death) 
Overall 
M SD 
1. 56 • 50 
Authoritarianism 21.31 2.68 
Equalitarianism 21.52 2.78 
Anti-authoritar- 17.17 2.27 
ianism 
Just World Scale 75.65 8.75 
Capital Punish. 6.87 2.09 
Scale 
Punish. of Crim. 5.30 1.13 
Scale 
Victim Suffering 6.41 2.20 
Victim Responsi- 4.31 2.00 
bility 
Defendant 5.30 2.93 
Responsibility 
Circumstance 5.94 2.18 
Responsibility 
Victim Similarity 2.47 1.78 
Defendant Simi- 2.42 1.82 
larity 
Murder Assault 
M SD M SD 
l. 53 • 50 1. 59 • 50 
l. 38 • 49 31.88 • 50 
21.54 2.57 21.04 2.80 
21.23 2.78 21.86 2.76 
17.22 2.23 17.11 2.33 
75.28 8.81 76.08 8.75 
7.09 2.05 6.60 2.13 
5.47 1.15 5.10 1.09 
7.32 2.02 5.34 1.92 
3.86 2.07 4.84 1.79 
5.11 3.05 5.52 2.78 
5.94 2.33 5.95 2.01 
2.26 1.85 2.71 1.67 
2.06 1.68 2.84 1.90 
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